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The ongoing U.S. “War on Terror” has prompted calls for the 
resumption of a military draft1 and fear of the same,2 along with 
official denials that a draft is anticipated.3  Such exchanges have a 
familiar ring and are virtually identical to those circulating during the 
Persian Gulf War.4  In 1980, when draft registration resumed after a 
five-year hiatus,5 similar draft anxiety circulated.6  The Cold War 
                                                          
 1. See Joel Brinkley, Defying Odds, 2 Lawmakers Push to Bring Back the Draft, N.Y. 
TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/politics/ 
27cnd-draft.html (reporting that two senior Democratic members of Congress urged 
their colleagues to support legislation calling for the reinstatement of the draft for 
men and women aged eighteen to twenty-six); Darryl Fears, 2 Key Members of Black 
Caucus Support Military Draft, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A8 (stating that two 
prominent members of the Congressional Black Caucus expressed support for a 
nationwide military draft). 
 2. See Elaine Rivera, For Students, Time to Wonder and Worry, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2003, at B3 (discussing the apprehensions of high school students facing the 
prospect of war with Iraq and the possible implementation of a draft); Michael 
Corkery, Uncertainty Looms Large on College Campuses, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 22, 2001, at 
A1 (reporting that Providence area college students worry about possible war and a 
draft). 
 3. See Defenselink, DoD Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Meyers (Jan. 7, 
2003), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01072003_t0107sd.html  
(quoting Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld as saying that the Pentagon is 
not planning to reimplement a draft) (on file with author); Lisa Hoffman, 
Reinstitution of Military Draft All but Ruled Out, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at 10A 
(quoting assurances from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others that no draft is 
envisioned). 
 4. See Keith Harriston, Students Anxious Over Mideast; While Supportive of U.S. 
Action, Many Fear a Draft, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1990, at D1 (presenting student views 
on the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf and on a draft that, if called, would not 
exempt college students); Bill McCallister, Officials Deny Plan to Revive Draft, But 
Rumors Persist, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1991, at A23 (reporting that the White House and 
the Department of Defense (DoD) uniformly discounted rumors of reviving the 
draft). 
 5. See Carter Signs Registration Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1980, at A7 (reporting 
President Jimmy Carter’s approval of the congressional resolution that provided 
funding for renewed registration); see also Doug Bandow, Draft Registration: The Politics 
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events that precipitated the draft’s return, however, had not resulted 
and would not result in armed U.S. conflict.7 
An examination of the modern U.S. armed forces, evolving world 
affairs, and domestic political and social forces strongly indicates that 
the United States is unlikely to reinstitute a military draft.8  In fact, 
the possibility of a military draft has become so remote that Selective 
Service, which administers draft registration and would administer a 
draft if one were reestablished,9 appears increasingly isolated from 
national defense policy.10  Within this isolation, Selective Service 
continues to impose a gender-specific requirement of registration on 
young men.11  To encourage compliance, Selective Service promotes 
and orchestrates a variety of punitive actions against violators.12 
                                                                                                                                      
of Institutional Immortality, POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 214, at 3 (Aug. 15, 1994), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-214.html (explaining that Congress initiated 
military draft registration during World War I, reinstituted it for World War II, again 
shortly after World War II, and the practice continued until 1975). 
 6. See James Barron, Students’ Anger and Approval Evoked by Call on Draft, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1980, at A12 (presenting reactions of U.S. college students to 
President Carter’s proposal for a renewal of registration, with the students divided 
between support for such legislation and fear that such action would result in a 
draft); 76% in Poll Say War Is Likely in a Few Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1981, at A8 
(reporting that three out of four Americans polled indicated that war was inevitable 
and that popular support for the draft was declining); see also Carter Says Registration Is 
Not a Major Sacrifice, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1980, at A8 (reporting President Carter’s 
assurance to young men subject to registration that an actual draft was not 
envisioned). 
 7. See NOEL E. FIRTH & JAMES H. NOREN, SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING: A HISTORY OF 
CIA ESTIMATES, 1950-1990, at 210-211 (1998) (explaining that Soviet military 
manpower and military construction increased since 1967 and chronicling events in 
the mid-1980s that led Soviet leaders to anticipate a war with the United states that 
never came). 
 8. See infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text (arguing that the United States 
is unlikely to reinstitute the draft). 
 9. See The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 
Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309(a) (2000)) (creating the 
Selective Service to administer the first peacetime draft). 
 10. See Doug Bandow, Time to Kill Draft Registration, TODAY’S COMMENTARY (Aug. 
10, 1999), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-10-99.html (relating the DoD position 
that registration has little measurable effect on military mobilization or recruitment) 
(on file with author). 
 11. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000) 
(amended 1981) (mandating that all male U.S. citizens and resident aliens between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six are subject to Selective Service registration at a 
time and manner dictated by Presidential Proclamation).  One such Presidential 
Proclamation imposed certain identification requirements, described the place and 
time for registration, and explained the manner in which persons were to comply 
with the registration process.  See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted 
in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 16-18 (1994) (calling for the registration of men between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six through the authority granted to the President 
under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA)). 
 12. See Selective Service System, Benefits and Programs Linked to Registration, at 
http://www.sss.gov/Fsbenefits.htm (revised Sept. 5, 2000) (describing a range of 
federal benefits denied to those who fail to register, including student financial aid, 
job training, federal employment, and additional state imposed sanctions) (on file 
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In 1981, shortly after registration was reinstituted, the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard Rostker v. Goldberg,13 a gender-based challenge 
to the registration requirement.14  In Rostker, the Court reasoned that 
judicial deference to Congress is particularly appropriate in the 
context of military affairs.15  The Court also reasoned that men and 
women are not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or 
registration for a draft,16 and that Congress extensively considered the 
questions of registering women prior to its decision to reactivate the 
process of exclusively registering men.17  Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that Congress acted within its constitutional power when it 
authorized the registration of men, and not women, under the 
Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).18 
The ruling quieted subsequent gender-based challenges to 
registration.19  Irrespective of whether the Court’s reasoning and 
conclusion in Rostker were correct, no U.S. court since has signaled a 
retreat from these positions.20 
The passage of time and a mounting body of evidence indicate, 
however, that today’s Selective Service does not serve the national 
                                                                                                                                      
with author). 
 13. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 14. See id. at 61 n.2 (explaining that Rostker actually grew out of a dormant 
lawsuit, Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974), from the days of the 
Vietnam War).  The district court in Rostker revived Rowland by certifying a plaintiff 
class of all men registered or subject to registration.  Id. at 61-62. 
 15. See id. at 66 (explaining that recent decisions of the Court reinforce 
deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs). 
 16. See id. at 79 (observing that congressional and executive bans on women 
serving in combat support a finding that women and men are not similarly situated 
because the purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential combat troops). 
 17. See id. at 72 (contradicting appellees’ assertion that Congress acted 
“unthinkingly” in funding registration for men only). 
 18. See id. at 79 (finding that the exemption of women from registration is closely 
related to Congress’s purpose in authorizing draft registration). 
 19. In the few subsequent challenges to MSSA, the Supreme Court upheld 
registration enforcement legislation while assuming the validity of the underlying 
registration requirement itself.  See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest 
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (arguing unsuccessfully that the Department 
of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 § 1113(f)(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (2000), 
which requires male students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register 
for the draft prior to receiving federal financial aid, was a bill of attainder and a 
violation of non-registrants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (challenging, without success, the 
prosecution of a vocal opponent to draft registration for his failure to register, as a 
form of selective prosecution).  The Court has not heard arguments against any 
aspect of draft registration since 1985. 
 20. The Supreme Court has not ruled on any challenges to registration since 
Rostker.  The only significant challenge to registration following Rostker was Detenber 
v. Turnage.  See 701 F.2d 233 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983) 
(rejecting an argument that peacetime registration is a deprivation of liberty without 
due process of law and reinforcing the concept of judicial deference to the President 
and Congress in the context of military affairs).   
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defense purpose presumed by the Court in Rostker.21  Since that 
decision, conditions under which the Department of Defense (DoD) 
evaluated its own personnel needs and upon which the Court 
partially based its decision have changed drastically.22  Similarly, 
conditions under which the Court evaluated the need for registration 
also are markedly different today.23  Despite sporadic calls for its 
resumption and numerous instances of U.S. military involvement, no 
draft has been declared since registration resumed in 1981.24  
Registration was originally coupled with an active military draft.25  The 
current registration has never served a military draft,26 and with each 
passing year, it becomes more apparent that registration serves no 
legitimate defense purpose27 and will not be used for conscription,28 
the compulsory enrollment of persons for military service.29  
This Comment proposes that the current draft registration serves 
no legitimate national defense purpose.  Part I details events leading 
                                                          
 21. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text (discussing altered U.S. defense 
strategies and priorities, which merit a reevaluation of Rostker). 
 22. See Edwin Dorn, Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, in PROFESSIONAL ON THE 
FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 3, 19 (J. Eric Fredland et al. 
eds., 1996) (observing that the percentage of women in the All-Volunteer Force 
(AVF) rose from three percent in 1973 to twelve percent in 1994); see also Mark J. 
Eitelberg, The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years, in PROFESSIONAL ON THE FRONT 
LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 66, 70-77 (J. Eric Fredland et al. 
eds., 1996) (reporting that the decrease in the number of applicants to the AVF 
between 1973 and 1992 was accompanied by an equally dramatic rise in the quality of 
applicants).  For example, in 1992, over ninety-five percent of new recruits were high 
school graduates, versus fifty-two percent in 1973.  Id. at 71. 
 23. See infra notes 300-30 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility of 
a time consuming draft contributing to the rapid mobilization of forces in times of 
crisis, which renders registration in advance of a draft unnecessary). 
 24. See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, 2001-2002 MILITARY ALMANAC 50-53 
(2002) [hereinafter MILITARY ALMANAC] (reporting selected U.S. military actions 
after the Vietnam War, which have included actions in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, 
Panama, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and Kosovo). 
 25. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1981) (asserting that registration 
is inseparable from induction and thus subject to the same degree of judicial 
deference); but see infra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (reviewing the historic 
and current separateness of registration and induction); see also Bandow, supra note 
5, at 8-9 (explaining that prior to the current registration system, registration took 
place as a part of conscription at the beginning of the two world wars and continued 
to operate as such until the end of the Vietnam War). 
 26. See Selective Service System, Induction Statistics, at http://www.sss.gov/ 
induct.htm (revised Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Induction Statistics] (reporting that 
no one has been inducted into the U.S. military through Selective Service since 1973, 
prior to reinstatement of registration 1980). 
 27. See generally infra Part III (arguing that registration does not serve current 
military needs and fails even to adequately accomplish its stated objective). 
 28. See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (summarizing the DoD position 
that registration was not needed and the likelihood of a need for conscripts was 
extremely remote). 
 29. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (Merriam-Webster 
1983). 
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to the current registration, traces the history of judicial decisions that 
support it, and analyzes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rostker v. 
Goldberg.30  Part II discusses changes in the U.S. military which subvert 
many of the Court’s assumptions in Rostker, reviews the altered state 
of world affairs and military strategy,31 and examines the evolving role 
of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and women in the military.  Part III 
illustrates the illegitimacy of draft registration as a component of 
national defense by documenting the irrelevance of registration to 
military planning, the failure of Selective Service to effectively serve a 
defense interest, the reasons why the Court should not defer to 
Congress regarding registration, and the political forces that have 
maintained registration despite its failure.32  This Comment 
concludes that the positions asserted by the Rostker Court are 
incompatible with current U.S. defense priorities33 and the liberty 
interests of citizens who are subject to registration. 
I. FOUNDATIONS OF CURRENT DRAFT REGISTRATION 
The current era of Selective Service registration in the United 
States began in 1980, when President Carter called for the 
resumption of draft registration in a State of the Union Address.34  
                                                          
 30. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-67 (affirming the legislative action by deferring to 
the broad discretionary powers of Congress to raise and regulate the armed forces). 
 31. See MICHAEL J. MAZARR ET AL., DESERT STORM: THE GULF WAR AND WHAT WE 
LEARNED 160-63 (1993) (asserting that during the years 1989-1992 the context of U.S. 
military planning shifted from the massive threat posed by the Soviet Union to 
smaller regional conflicts like the Persian Gulf war, thereby demanding rapid but 
limited responses coordinated with U.S. allies). 
 32. See Doug Bandow, Dubious Draft Registration: It is up to the Incoming Republican 
Majority to Abolish the Sign-Up and Save $25 Million a Year, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 
D3 (arguing that the Clinton Administration’s reasons for maintaining registration 
no longer exist because the threat of war with the Soviet Union had been eliminated 
and future U.S. military involvement can be supported adequately by the existing 
active and reserve forces). 
 33. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, 2002 Department of Defense Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress (Aug. 15, 2002) (outlining the projected post-September 
11th transformation of national defense, including improvements in technology, 
mobility, intelligence, and quality of personnel), available at http://www. 
defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/html_files/Message.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2003).  
 34. See State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980) in Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1980-81 194, 198 (1981) [hereinafter 
“State of the Union Address”] (announcing President Carter’s intention to send 
draft registration legislation and a budget proposal to Congress, and expressing 
Carter’s hope that a draft would not be needed), available at http://www. 
jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml (last modified July 21, 
2001).  President Gerald Ford discontinued draft registration in 1975.  See 
Proclamation No. 4360, 3 C.F.R. § 462 (1971-1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, 
at 347 (2000) (terminating existing registration procedures and announcing that 
replacement procedures would provide for periodic registration); see also Military 
Selective Service Act of 1967, § 5, amended by Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 101(9)(d)-(e), 
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The address focused exclusively on foreign affairs35 and particularly 
on the Soviet Union, whose recent invasion of Afghanistan Carter 
condemned.36  The resumption of registration was one of a number 
of measures Carter called for in response to the invasion.37  Under the 
MSSA, the President does not have the power to order the 
registration of women.38  Nevertheless, Carter recommended that 
Congress amend the MSSA to extend the registration requirement to 
both men and women.39  After months of often skeptical debate in 
the House and the Senate,40 Congress responded by authorizing 
funding for the registration of men only.41  In addition to Rostker, 
several other significant but ultimately unsuccessful legal challenges 
to the onset of registration followed.42  Opposition to registration was 
ultimately derailed by courts, which extended longstanding judicial 
acceptance of conscription to registration.43 
                                                                                                                                      
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 455 (2000) (authorizing the conscription of up to 
270,000 persons into the armed forces through July 1, 1973); Pub. Law 92-129, 
§ 101(29), 65 Stat. 87 (1971) (maintaining Selective Service as an active standby 
organization even if DoD employs an AVF). 
 35. See Terence Smith, The World Has Changed and So Has Jimmy Carter, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 1980, at E2 (reporting that in order to devote his oral address to a “global 
review,” President Carter planned to issue a separate, written State of the Union 
message to Congress that addressed domestic affairs). 
 36. See State of the Union Address, supra note 34, at 196 (characterizing the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan as the most serious threat to peace since 
World War II). 
 37. See id. (calling for a number of other measures, including a U.S.-led boycott 
of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow). 
 38. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2000) 
(amended 1981) (granting the President discretionary powers to draft males only). 
 39. See Carter Plan on Draft: 20-Year-Olds First in Lottery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1980, at 
A17 (reporting President Carter’s formal request to Congress for funding to register 
both men and women). 
 40. See Richard Halloran, President’s Draft Registration Plan Arouses Skepticism at 
Senate Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1980, at A12 (quoting comments from Sen. Mark 
Hatfield that registration was a waste of money that would not aide national defense, 
and from Sen. Harrison Schmidt that the proposal was a political ploy to distract 
from more pressing military shortcomings); see also Richard Halloran, Group in House 
Expresses Doubt On Draft Signup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1980, at A16 (reporting 
opposition to registration in a House Appropriations Subcommittee, which cited 
reasons ranging from the registration’s inability to enhance national defense to the 
fact that women were included in Carter’s request).  In response to the opposition of 
the inclusion of women, the Carter Administration amended its request so that 
registration of men and women would be considered separately.  Id. 
 41. See H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 14308 (1980) (enacted) 
(appropriating $13 million for the registration of men in a manner to be determined 
by the President). 
 42. See cases cited supra note 19 (noting cases challenging registration-
enforcement without challenging the registration requirement itself). 
 43. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (affirming Congress’s 
power to make all laws necessary to raise and support armies, including the 
establishment of registration procedures to insure the availability of conscripts). 
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A. The Draft and the Courts 
Prior to the current Selective Service registration, every draft 
registration in U.S. history was coupled with an active system of 
conscription.44  The history of federal conscription before the mid-
twentieth century is brief, consisting of two years during the Civil 
War45 and two years during World War I.46  World War II changed 
that, however, and young men were conscripted every year during the 
period 1940-1973,47 except for a brief experiment with an AVF in 
1947.48 
The first attempt to impose conscription in the United States took 
place during the War of 1812.49  Congress defeated the proposed 
plan, asserting that the federal government did not have the 
authority to conscript.50  A federal draft was finally imposed during 
the Civil War,51 and it led to the first legal challenge to draft laws.52  In 
                                                          
 44. See James B. Jacobs & Dennis McNamara, Selective Service Without a Draft, in 10 
ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 361, 363 (1984) (noting that U.S. registration in both world 
wars began after draft legislation was introduced). 
 45. See Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1544-46 (1969) (noting the passage of a draft 
law in March 1863 and its expiration without renewal in April 1865). 
 46. See Selective Service System, Induction Statistics, at http://www.sss.gov/ 
induct.htm (revised Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Induction Statistics] (stating that the 
number of U.S. military inductees during World War I was 516,212 in 1917 and 
2,294,084 in 1918) (on file with author). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940-1973, at 90-95 (1993) (documenting 
the adoption of an AVF in 1947 in response to pressures from the public and 
Truman’s belief that it was more important to recruit scientists and invest in 
scientific methods of war than draft civilians).  The AVF failed to fill the Army’s 
authorized numbers and was discontinued as the danger of the Cold War became 
apparent.  Id. at 100-08. 
 49. See Michael J. Malbin, Conscription, The Constitution, and the Framers: An 
Historical Analysis, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 805, 820-21 (1972) (noting that conscription 
was a component of the apparent favorite of four plans advanced by Secretary of War 
James Monroe to improve the state of the army in 1814, toward the end of the War of 
1812); see also RICHARD V.L. COOPER, MILITARY MANPOWER AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER 
FORCE 48 & n.8 (1977) (differentiating the plan to draft 40,000 men from modern 
drafts because under the early plan all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-
five were subject to either federal military service or a tax dedicated to the pay of 
those that did serve—a plan which so infuriated New England states that they refused 
to raise militias for the war). 
 50. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1542-43 (citing Daniel Webster’s attack on the 
Monroe Plan as beyond the federal power to call upon state militia in times of 
emergency and contrary to the character of the Constitution); see also DOUG BANDOW, 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEFENSE MANPOWER 102 (1989) (noting Congress’s refusal to 
authorize a draft, even in response to the capture of Washington and the burning of 
the White House, and the threatened secession of several New England states over 
the issue).  But see Malbin, supra note 49, at 821 (asserting that Congress had the 
numbers to vote on conscription but was delayed by disagreements over the length of 
conscription and noting that because the war ended while Congress was in recess, 
the issue was ultimately rendered moot). 
 51. Federal Conscription Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863). 
 52. See Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863)[hereinafter Kneedler II] (finding that: 
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1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the federal draft in 
Kneedler v. Lane.53  That same year, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, prepared an opinion in anticipation of a 
federal court challenge to the Federal Conscription Act,54 asserting 
that the Act was unconstitutional because it assumed powers 
originally granted to the states.55  Chief Justice Taney retired in 1864, 
having never been presented with the opportunity to utilize the 
opinion.56  Although conscription during the Civil War was an 
emotionally charged issue,57 in actuality, the number of drafted men 
who served was relatively negligible, amounting to no more than 
50,000-100,000 men out of a total Union force exceeding 2.5 
million.58 
                                                                                                                                      
(1) Congress’s power to raise and support armies granted in Article I, Section 8 of 
the Constitution includes the power to conscript; (2) as the supreme law of the land, 
constitutional rights require deference by the states; and (3) because the plaintiffs 
admitted that they were subject to the Federal Conscription Act and because the Act 
is constitutional, the plaintiffs deserve no relief in equity and preliminary injunctions 
must be vacated), available at 1863 Pa. LEXIS 152; but see Friedman, supra note 45, at 
1550 (noting that the 3-2 vote in Kneedler I against the Civil War draft was, 
subsequently vacated by a 3-2 vote of the reconstituted court in Kneedler II, but three 
of the six judges considering the matter held that Congress did not have the power 
to enforce direct conscription, thus narrowing the decision). 
 53. See Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 272 (1863) [hereinafter Kneedler I] 
(concluding the power to conscript is not granted by the Constitution and the 
federal conscription plan unconstitutionally integrated the federal Army and state 
militias), available at 1863 Pa. LEXIS 151.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued 
an injunction, but the term of Chief Justice Lowrie, the author of the opinion, 
subsequently expired and his replacement favored the draft.  Friedman, supra note 
45, at 1549-50.  The recomposed court vacated the injunction without hearing 
additional evidence.  Id.; see also Kneedler II, 45 Pa. 238 at 295 (vacating the 
preliminary injunction granted in Kneedler I). 
 54. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731. 
 55. See Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE 
MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 207, 208-18 (Martin Anderson 
& Barbara Honegger eds., 1982) (asserting that the power to draft men into armies 
lies with the states rather than the federal government, and that to allow conscription 
by both state and federal governments renders the constitutional distinction between 
the two meaningless). 
 56. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1548 (noting that no challenge to federal 
conscription reached the Supreme Court by the time Chief Justice Taney retired 
from the Court). 
 57. See JAMES W. GEARY, WE NEED MEN: THE UNION DRAFT AND THE CIVIL WAR 167 
(1991) (explaining that, in addition to inciting draft-related riots in New York City, 
the draft was perceived by many in the North as a system that forced poor men to 
fight for the benefit of rich men). 
 58. See id. at 173 (calculating that 3.7% of Union troops were conscripts); see also 
RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 210 (1984) (explaining that 
the federal draft system during the Civil War allowed conscripts to purchase 
commutation and maintained most of the remaining conscripts as unactivated 
substitutes, resulting in only 46,347 conscripts actually serving in a total force of 
2,666,999 men); EUGENE CONVERSE MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE 
CIVIL WAR DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM 210 (1967) (stating that of the 151,488 men 
drawn for draft consideration in New York State, only 3,210 were actually drafted, 
with the remainder failing to report, exempt, or permitted to purchase commutation 
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World War I brought another federal draft, after a nearly fifty-year 
hiatus, and this draft produced substantial numbers of men.59  This 
wartime draft resulted in a number of legal challenges, which the 
Supreme Court ultimately heard collectively.60  In a landmark 
decision, the Court in Selective Draft Law Cases unanimously upheld 
the federal government’s power to conscript,61 a power which it 
concluded stems from Congress’s constitutionally granted powers “to 
raise and support Armies.”62  The Court devoted considerable time to 
analyzing the draft as it was used in the Civil War.63  The Court found 
support for its conclusion in the rulings of several Confederate state 
courts that supported the draft,64 as well as in Kneedler.65  The Court 
was apparently unaware of Chief Justice Taney’s undelivered opinion 
finding the Civil War draft to be unconstitutional.66  The Court’s 
portrayal of Civil War history in Selected Draft Law Cases conveys the 
false impression that considerable numbers of men were conscripted 
and that they played a vital role in the war.67 
                                                                                                                                      
or pay for substitutes). 
 59. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting a total of 2,810,296 men were 
conscripted during World War I). 
 60. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
 61. See id. at 377 (concluding that the framers of the Constitution intentionally 
granted Congress the power to conscript). 
 62. Id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have the 
Power . . . [t]o raise and support Armies.”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The 
Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”). 
 63. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 385-89 (discussing the decision to 
impose a Civil War draft and asserting that the soldiers garnered through the draft 
were critical to the Union’s success). 
 64. Id. at 388 (citing In re Pille, 39 Ala. 459 (1864); In re Emerson, 39 Ala. 437 
(1864); Ex Parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429 (1863); Parker v. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136 (1865); 
Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 27 (1864); Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38 (1864); 
Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347 (1862); Summons v. Miller, 40 Miss. 19 (1864); Gatlin v. 
Walton, 60 N.C. 333 (1864); Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 386 (1862); Burroughs v. 
Payton, 57 Va. 470 (1864)). 
 65. See Kneedler II, 45 Pa. 238, 295 (1863) (vacating the preliminary injunction 
granted in Kneedler I).  In Selective Draft Law Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court cites 
Kneedler II without mentioning that the Pennsylvania Court’s original ruling did not 
support the draft. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 388 (citing only the Kneedler 
II decision vacating the preliminary injunctions granted to the plaintiffs and 
declaring the draft unconstitutional).  What was in essence a tie vote at the state 
court level became a major foundational element of a unanimous Supreme Court 
vote affirming federal conscription powers fifty-two years later.  Friedman, supra note 
45, at 1544. 
 66. Taney, supra note 55, at 218.  See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1494-95, 1546 
(arguing that the Supreme Court based its decision in the Selective Draft Law Cases on 
superficial evidence and disregarded substantial historical findings to the contrary, 
including Taney’s opinion). 
 67. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 387 (stating that 250,000 men were 
conscripted by the end of 1864).  But see WEIGLEY, supra note 58, at 210 (placing the 
total number of conscripts who actually served at 46,347). 
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The ruling in Selective Draft Law Cases, though consistently followed 
by the Supreme Court,68 has been criticized by a wide range of legal 
scholars and historians.69  The decision was announced against a 
polarized national backdrop, pitting patriotism and nationalism 
against a significant anti-war movement.70  Some modern 
commentators argue that, despite this ruling, Congress simply does 
not have the constitutional authority to institute a nationwide draft.71  
Irrespective of academic and historical disagreement, Selective Draft 
Law Cases is the authority upon which the Rostker ruling and the 
current system of draft registration rest.   
                                                          
 68. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (citing Selective Draft 
Law Cases for the proposition that it is “beyond question” that Congress has the 
power to conscript); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944) (citing Selective 
Draft Law Cases and affirming congressional power to raise armies by both enlistment 
and conscription). 
 69. See, e.g., David M. Stigler, Conscription and Constitutional Law, in 2 STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE III-6-1, 
2-3 (G.P.O. 1970) (faulting the Court’s decision in Selective Draft Law Cases for 
conceding to a nationwide pro-war fervor and arguing that the decision should be 
read narrowly to apply to only a war-time draft); Friedman, supra note 45, at 1551 
(criticizing the Selective Draft Law Cases’ constitutional analysis for focusing on the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude while ignoring the 
early history of the military clauses); JOHN WHITCLAY CHAMBERS II, TO RAISE AN ARMY: 
THE DRAFT COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 221 (Free Press 1987) (characterizing the 
decision more as a product of political forces in the United States at that time and 
less a product of legal and historical analysis).  But see LOREN P. BETH, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at 163-64 (Harper 1971) 
(arguing that the ruling is supported by case law establishing the principle that 
national emergencies justify extraordinary measures). 
 70. See Stigler, supra note 69, at III-6-2-3 (describing the decision as being heavily 
influenced by hostility to the anti-war movement).  The government went to great 
lengths to suppress opposition to the war.  See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1550-51 
(noting that this time period witnessed significant erosion of civil liberties and those 
who spoke out against the war or the draft were jailed under the Espionage Act). 
 71. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 1519 (noting that the question of federal 
conscription was not discussed at the Constitutional Convention and arguing that the 
framers of the Constitution were unlikely to believe that Congress had the power to 
conscript because no other country had those powers at the time); Charles A. 
Lofgren, Compulsory Military Service Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 
in “GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE”: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 68-69 (Oxford 1986) (arguing the 
understanding of the Constitution at the time of its enactment was that the country 
would be defended by a state militia system, which had the power to conscript in 
time of emergency, and a smaller federal standing army that would be composed of 
non-conscripted professionals); Stigler, supra note 69, at III-6-1 (arguing that “there 
is no clear-cut historical justification for considering any conscription to be 
mandated or even allowed by the language of the Constitution”).  But see Malbin, 
supra note 49, at 811 (suggesting that while the only mention of conscription at the 
Constitutional Convention was a single negative comment by Edmund Randolph, the 
failure of the Convention to explicitly reject federal conscription following this 
comment “constitutes an implicit acceptance” of federal draft powers). 
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B. The Rostker v. Goldberg Standards 
1. The origins of Rostker v. Goldberg 
Rostker v. Goldberg72 stemmed from a Vietnam-era class action, 
Rowland v. Tarr,73 which sought relief from enforcement of draft 
registration on a variety of grounds, including equal protection.74  In 
Rowland, the plaintiffs requested a three-judge panel,75 which was 
required to issue an injunction against enforcement of a federal 
statute.76  Instead, a single judge found that the case involved a 
political question and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for non-
justiciability.77  On appeal, all the original counts were dismissed 
except the equal protection claim.78  The case was remanded for 
determination of the plaintiffs’ standing by a three-judge panel.79  On 
remand, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing 
because the constitutionality of the MSSA was a justiciable issue.80  
After this victory, the case saw no activity for five years. 
In 1979, the attempted dismissal of the case for inactivity brought it 
back to life.81  The case was relitigated as Goldberg v. Rostker,82 
reflecting the addition of new lead party Robert Goldberg, and the 
incoming director of Selective Service, Bernard Rostker.83  At trial, a 
three-judge panel held that the complete exclusion of women from 
draft registration was not substantially related to an important 
                                                          
 72. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 73. 341 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 74. The court did not address any of the plaintiffs’ claims but instead focused 
only on the jurisdiction issue.  Id. 
 75. See Rowland, 341 F. Supp. at 340 (noting that the court does not have clear 
guidelines regarding when to grant the three-judge hearing). 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (repealed 1976) (requiring a panel of three judges to issue 
an injunction of a federal statute on constitutional grounds). 
 77. See Rowland, 341 F. Supp. at 342-43 (finding that the determination that the 
case involved a political question was buttressed by precedent upholding Congress’s 
power to conscript). 
 78. See Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545, 546 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding that the 
plaintiffs’ other claims were foreclosed by previous Supreme Court decisions or were 
non-justiciable because of mootness stemming from the end of the Vietnam War). 
 79. Id. at 547. 
 80. See Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766, 771-72 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (ruling that 
plaintiffs’ alleged harm as a result of the Act was a matter of objective fact and 
rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
 81. See Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing how 
the case was scheduled to be dismissed for inactivity in accordance with a local rule). 
 82. 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 83. See Linda K. Kerber, A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . Ladies: Women, 
Civic Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 101-102 
(1993) (noting that the original plaintiffs dropped out of the case because they 
began the litigation as an anti-war case and the remaining equal protection claim 
implied that the plaintiffs agreed with draft—if only it were also applied to women). 
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government interest.84  The court found that the MSSA violated the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and it permanently enjoined 
the government from requiring class members to register for the 
draft under the MSSA.85 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, sitting as Circuit 
Justice,86 suspended this court order in response to Rostker’s in-
chambers stay application.87  Justice Brennan was persuaded that 
national security could be endangered by enforcement of the district 
court’s injunction.88  The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 
and the case was brought directly to the Court.89  The Rostker case 
began as an anti-war/anti-draft case.90  It ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court as solely an equal protection case, at a time when the 
United States was not fighting a war and had no active draft.91 
2. The Court’s analysis in Rostker 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rostker upheld registration as it 
was then and essentially still is today.92  In Rostker, the only challenge 
                                                          
 84. See Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 605 (finding the MSSA violated equal protection 
because it failed intermediate scrutiny). 
 85. See id.  (finding there was no convincing reason presented to justify the 
exclusion of women from registration). 
 86. See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2000) (giving the Supreme Court the power to assign its 
Justices to each of the federal circuits); see also Frank Felleman & John C. Wright, 
Note, The Powers of the Supreme Justice Acting in an Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L. 
REV. 981, 984-85 (1964) (describing the work of a circuit justice).  A circuit justice 
received all applications from the assigned circuit, including applications for stays, 
bail, and time extensions.  Id. at 985. 
 87. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., Circuit 
Justice, 3d Cir.) (explaining that a four-part showing must be made to justify the 
extraordinary measure of a single Circuit Justice staying the enforcement of a district 
court order:  (1) there must be a “reasonable probability” that the Supreme Court 
will grant certiorari; (2) there must be a “fair probability” that the Court will overturn 
the lower court order; (3) the applicant must demonstrate irreparable harm from 
enforcement of the court order; and (4) the balance of the equities must favor the 
applicant). 
 88. Id. at 1309 (noting that absent a suspension, the lower court’s injunction of 
draft registration would remain in effect even if there was a national crisis). 
 89. Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1980) (denying that motion of 
Stacey Acker et al. for leave to intervene and noting probable jurisdiction). 
 90. See Kerber, supra note 83, at 100-01 (noting that although the original 
plaintiffs included an equal protection claim, they really saw the case as part of the 
anti-war movement). 
 91. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1981) (characterizing the case in 
its current form as a peacetime challenge to registration transformed from its 
beginnings as a  challenge brought at the height of the Vietnam war). 
 92. See id. at 83 (finding registration of men only does not violate the 
constitution); Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 453, at 16-18 (1994) (calling for a gradual registration first of those born in 1960, 
then in 1961, and finally in 1962, with those born in 1963 and subsequent years 
registering upon their eighteenth birthday).  The current requirement calls for all 
male citizens or permanent resident aliens to register within thirty days of their 
eighteenth birthday.  Selective Service System, When to Register, at 
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to draft registration considered by the Supreme Court,93 the plaintiffs 
argued that requiring only men to register for the draft violated the 
Fifth Amendment.94  The Court reviewed recommendations made by 
the DoD and the Carter Administration that women be included in 
draft registration,95 but ultimately found that Congress was justified in 
rejecting these suggestions.96 
The majority opinion characterized support for registering women 
as being motivated by an interest in equality, rather than by military 
necessity,97 and found that Congress was justified in focusing solely on 
military needs.98  The Court gave considerable weight to Congress’s 
own analysis of whether to register and draft women,99 and found that 
Congress adequately considered equal protection issues when 
deciding to fund the registration of men only.100  The Court 
concluded that Congress was within its power in furthering a 
legitimate military interest to impose registration on men only.101 
In finding that registration was a violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the district court distinguished 
inclusion of women in draft registration from the discriminate 
military induction of women.102  The Supreme Court, however, 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.sss.gov/when.htm (revised July 9, 2002)  (on file with author). 
 93. In the only post-Rostker challenge of registration, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld a lower court ruling affirming draft registration. See Detenber v. 
Turnage, 701 F.2d 233, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983) 
(challenging draft registration as due process violation).  Opposition to the draft is 
not a recent phenomenon.  It was widespread during the Civil War, World War I, and 
the Vietnam War.  See CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 54-55 (noting that conscription 
during the Civil War produced draft riots and widespread failure to register); FLYNN, 
supra note 48, at 174-76 (Kansas Univ. Press 1993) (describing draft resistance during 
the Vietnam War such as burning draft cards, protests, and the destruction of 
records at local recruiting boards); Friedman, supra note 45, at 1550-51 (describing 
the breadth of opposition to the draft in World War I, which included ministers, 
socialists, and mid-western farmers). 
 94. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59 (articulating the issue of the case as whether MSSA 
regulations authorizing the President to require only males to register violates the 
Fifth Amendment). 
 95. See id. at 72 (noting that Congress held extensive hearings on the question of 
requiring women to register). 
 96. See id. at 74 (finding that Congress considered the issue carefully and made 
its intent clear). 
 97. Id. at 79-80. 
 98. See id. at 80-81 (noting that even those military experts who supported the 
registration of women were opposed to actually drafting women because they could 
not be used in combat). 
 99. Id. at 72. 
 100. See id. at 77 (finding that the prohibition of women from combat was a 
legitimate basis on which to decide not to require women to register for the draft). 
 101. Id. at 83. 
 102. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 604-05 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (asserting that 
registration of women would increase “military flexibility” and induction calls of 
women could be made according to military need, with no requirement that men 
and women be drafted in equal numbers). 
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declined to view the federal power to require registration and the 
federal power to conscript as separate entities.103  The Court cited 
with approval congressional testimony asserting that the registration 
is intended to draft and mobilize troops for combat.104  It added that 
women are barred from combat by statute, rules, and practice, and 
thus could not be mobilized by such a draft.105  Because of the 
restrictions against women in combat, the Court concluded that 
women are not similarly situated for the purposes of a draft or 
registration.106  The Constitution, the Court held, is therefore not 
offended by such an exclusion.107 
After reaching the conclusion that women are excluded from 
combat, the Court examined the potential use of a draft, which would 
induct women into non-combat roles.108  Based on Senate testimony, 
the Court found that only a small number of women might be 
deployed into non-combat roles in a national emergency.109  It 
concluded that this small number would place a burden on the 
training facilities and produce no additional combat troops.110 
The Court’s consideration of the role of women in the military 
appears uninformed by the increased presence of women in the 
military at that time.111  The Court quoted the testimony of General 
                                                          
 103. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75 (citing congressional testimony to support the 
Court’s position that “induction is interlocked with registration” under the MSSA). 
 104. See id. at 76 (emphasizing the need to exercise judicial deference to 
Congress’s clear determination that, in the instance of a draft, there would be a need 
for combat troops). 
 105. See id. at 76-77 (enumerating the statutory and policy grounds for excluding 
women from combat). 
 106. See id. at 78 (reasoning that differential treatment of individuals in a draft 
based on race or religion can be distinguished from differential treatment of men 
and women in a draft because male members of different races or religions are 
“similarly situated” with regards to combat, while women and men, because of 
combat restrictions placed on women, are “simply not similarly situated” for purposes 
of a draft or registration). 
 107. See id. at 78-79 (concluding that because Congress has determined that the 
purpose of registration is to create a pool of combat troops, and because Congress 
and the Executive have determined that women should not serve in combat: (1) the 
exemption of women from combat is closely related to Congress’s purpose in 
authorizing registration; and (2) men and women are simply not similarly situated 
with regard to the draft, so there is no violation of the constitutional requirement 
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly). 
 108. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81 (discussing congressional testimony contemplating 
that, in the event of a draft of 650,000, the military could absorb 80,000 female 
inductees to fill non-combat positions, enabling men to assume combat roles). 
 109. See id. (deferring to findings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which 
rejected the suggestion that all women be registered, but only a “handful” be 
indicated in an emergency as “confused” and “unsatisfactory” (quoting S. Rep. No. 
96-826, at 158 (1980))). 
 110. See id. (citing congressional testimony that “training would be needlessly 
burdened by women recruits who could not be used in combat” (quoting S. REP. NO. 
96-226, at 9 (1979))). 
 111. See id. at 90-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contrasting congressional testimony 
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Bernard Rogers before a Senate hearing on women and registration, 
who asserted that all members of the military, regardless of position, 
may at some point during an emergency have to shoulder a weapon 
and fight.112  Women in the United States military are prohibited 
from engaging in combat.113  The General, and by extension the 
Court, seemed to say that women have no place in the military 
because all personnel must be counted on to engage in combat and 
women cannot do so by law.114 
This argument for excluding women from a potential draft is at 
odds with the view of the Court, which characterized conscription as 
the source for a stream of ground troops separate from personnel 
performing routine functions of the military.115  During a war, if that 
stream is insufficiently maintained because women are excluded from 
a draft, male non-ground troops must be called into action.116  This 
                                                                                                                                      
acknowledging and appreciating the expanded role of women in the military with 
the Court’s exclusive focus on women in combat).  The Court’s hypothetical ratio of 
women inductees, at approximately twelve percent, is presented with no 
acknowledgement of the actual numbers of women in the military at the time of the 
Rostker decision.  Id. at 81.  See Martin Binkin & Mark Eitelberg, Women and Minorities 
in the All-Volunteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT 
AND PROSPECT 73, 83 (William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (placing the ratio of women 
to total military personnel in 1981 at 8.9%).  The Supreme Court ruling relied on 
congressional testimony orchestrated by a Congress that itself appeared uninformed 
as to the actual role of women in the military.  Compare Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75 (1981) 
(citing comments by Sen. Warner equating registration with a draft, which would 
necessarily exclude women), with JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 445 (rev. ed., 1992) (citing Senator John Warner’s surprised 
observation that during preparations for B-52 strikes launched from England during 
the Persian Gulf War, “you couldn’t distinguish the men from the women . . . . The 
women were loading and fusing the 500 pound bombs the same as the men.”). 
 112. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 82 n.17 (stating that “in an emergency during war, the 
Army has often had to reach back into the support base, into the supporting 
elements in the operating base, and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks in an 
emergency; that is, to hand them a rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them in 
the front ranks”). 
 113. See Lorry Fenner, Either You Need These Women or You Don’t, in WOMEN IN THE 
MILITARY 5, 15, 30 n.18 (Rita James Simon, ed., 2001) (observing that Navy and Air 
Force women were excluded from combat by law, but Army service policy alone 
excluded women from combat, and that physical standards could effectively bar 
women where legislation did not).  See also infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text 
(discussing the former combat exclusion rule, known as the “Risk Rule,” which 
banned female U.S. military personnel from proximity to combat, and its 
replacement in 1994 with a rule that only prohibits such personnel from direct 
engagement in ground combat). 
 114. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 82 (reciting General Rogers’s testimony to support its 
position that Congress acted within the permissible exercise of its constitutional 
powers in excluding women from the draft).  
 115. Id. at 76 (maintaining the primary purpose of the draft is to supply combat 
troops and thus must consist solely of combat trained men). 
 116. See id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Senate testimony from Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Robert Pirie that the drafting of women for non-combat 
positions would allow a greater deployment of men into combat positions). 
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would potentially leave non-combat positions unfilled.117  Support 
personnel have long considerably outnumbered combat troops, as 
evidenced by the vast number of military jobs currently open to 
women despite the ban on women in ground combat.118  Yet the 
Court, partially basing its decision on exceptional circumstances 
recounted by Senator Warner,119 endorsed a system under which 
women might conceivably not even be drafted into a support role 
until all the men are killed.120 
In his dissent, Justice White observed that DoD testimony suggested 
that women, in fact, would be needed should there be a draft.121  He 
argued that the probability of women being drafted in unequal 
numbers did not justify excluding them from registration in 
furtherance of administrative convenience.122  Justice White also 
characterized the position of both the Court’s majority and that of 
Congress as having ignored “reality,” “common sense,” and 
“experience” by ignoring the increasing role that women have played 
in recent wars.123 
                                                          
 117. See id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Senate testimony from Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Richard Danzig that in a war-time in which 650,000 were 
drafted,  approximately 80,000 would be drafted to fill non-combat positions). 
 118. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text (chronicling a change in 
restrictions against women serving in many positions in the military, which has 
opened up ninety percent of military jobs to women); see also MICHAEL CLODFELTER, 
VIETNAM IN MILITARY STATISTICS: A HISTORY OF THE INDOCHINA WARS, 1772-1991, at 238 
(1995) (placing the ratio of U.S. ground troops to total number of military personnel 
in Vietnam at approximately twelve percent). 
 119. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (citing a particular episode during the Battle of the 
Bulge where General Patton had to reach back into the military support base and 
pull forward soldiers to fill ranks in an emergency, to support General Rogers’s 
conclusion that women should be excluded from the draft because combat eligibility 
is a prerequisite for all positions needing to be filled in a draft). 
 120. See id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) (voicing his conclusion that the majority’s 
opinion leaves no room for women in the military). 
 121. See id. at 84 (citing military testimony asserting that in a major military 
mobilization, 80,000 women could be deployed in support roles during the first six 
months). 
 122. Id. at 85; see also id. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that “additional 
cost and administrative inconvenience” are not sufficient arguments to support 
gender discrimination); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting that the 
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence rejects the notion of evoking administrative 
ease and convenience as justification for gender-based classifications); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-691 (1973) (asserting that administrative convenience 
cannot alone justify differing treatment according to gender within the armed 
services); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that classification based 
upon gender to eliminate an entire class from consideration and thus the workload 
of probate courts is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 123. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83. 
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3. The deference granted to Congress by the Rostker Court 
The Rostker Court accepted the gender-based classification without 
imposing a burden on the government to prove that the classification 
survived the heightened scrutiny traditionally called for.124  Instead, 
the Court shifted this burden to the plaintiff out of deference to 
Congress.125  It is not clear why the majority allocated the burden of 
proof in this way, though it was strongly questioned in Justice 
Marshall’s dissent.126 
The Court should have applied heightened scrutiny with the 
burden placed fully on the government to prove the close and 
substantial relationship between the discriminatory means employed 
and the asserted governmental objective,127 as has been traditionally 
done where gender classification is at issue.128  The Court, however, 
readily accepted evidence that supported the assertion that women 
and men were not similarly situated with regard to combat.129  Despite 
accepting some evidence that women could be drafted into non-
combat positions,130 the Court also accepted evidence which implied 
that everyone in the military should be counted on for combat.131  
                                                          
 124. Id. at 64-72; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (establishing that the burden of 
proof that a gender classification is substantially related to an important government 
interest rests upon the offending party); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689 (asserting that the 
government failed to prove that its discriminatory means served its stated end, 
though the Court had already ruled that end to be impermissibly based on 
administrative convenience).  
 125. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68-72 (emphasizing that judicial deference to 
congressional exercise of authority is “at its apogee” when legislative action involving 
Congress’ ability to raise and support armies and to regulate military matters is 
challenged). 
 126. See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court does not 
abdicate its ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional questions simply because 
it is required to accord deference to congressional judgements in the area of military 
affairs). 
 127. See id. at 67 (stating that even in military affairs, Congress is subject to Due 
Process requirements, yet subsequently extending deference to congressional 
judgment). 
 128. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (establishing the heightened scrutiny standard for 
gender classifications, requiring that they be substantially related to serving an 
important government objective); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-460 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 
278 (1979). 
 129. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76-77 (embracing Senate testimony that the purpose of 
a draft in war is to raise combat troops, and women are excluded from combat).  But 
see CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 238 (reporting that in 1968, 88% of the 543,000 
American troops deployed to Vietnam were support or administrative personnel, 
creating an image of many non-combat jobs available to women in a war). 
 130. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81 (admitting the possibility that some women could 
be drafted into non-combat positions but accepting Congress’s rationalization that 
this would cause excessive administrative burden). 
 131. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (citing extraordinary 
circumstances which may require that even support personnel enter combat). 
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The Court had no trouble connecting a draft of combat troops with a 
prohibition against women in combat,132 and might easily have found 
that the government could overcome the heightened burden of 
proof.133 
Justice White’s observation that Congress and the Court had 
ignored transformations in the military illustrates this Comment’s 
thesis, that modern military needs do not justify draft registration.134  
The Court asserted that registration is part of “a united and 
continuous process designed to raise an army speedily and 
efficiently.”135  Citing Senate testimony, the Court founds registration 
clearly linked to the rapid delivery of inductees and the rapid 
mobilization of troops.136  The Court did not specifically define what 
it meant by rapidity of induction and mobilization, either in its 
opinion or in its citation to the Senate testimony.  Rather, it focused 
on why a draft would be needed,137 and it deferred to congressional 
judgment on the question.138  The meaning of rapid and efficient 
deployment that the Court appeared to employ does not, however, 
correspond with the actual deployment time asserted by Selective 
Service,139 and the efficiency with which such a deployment could 
serve the needs of a vastly transformed U.S. military.140 
                                                          
 132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (defining a draft as a mechanism 
for raising combat troops). 
 133. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and for Reserve Affairs 
(Jan. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Aspin] (noting the current rule regarding deployment 
of women in the military, which still bans them from ground combat), at 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/women/memo0113.txt.  
 134. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (illustrating the Court’s inattention to the 
substantial contribution of women volunteers in recent wars). 
 135. Id. at 75 (quoting Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944)). 
 136. See id. (holding that “[a]n ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the 
preservation of our national security . . . . A functioning registration system is a vital 
part of any mobilization plan”). 
 137. See id. at 76 (citing Senate testimony concluding that a draft was intended to 
produce combat troops, without reference to how rapidly they would be supplied). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Selective Service System, Sequence of Events, at http://www.sss.gov/seq.htm 
(revised Apr. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Sequence of Events] (stating that Selective Service 
is required to deliver the first inductee to training camp within 193 days of the 
declaration of a draft) (on file with author). 
 140. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to the President and Congress: A 
Review of the Continued Requirement for Draft Registration at 12 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter 
Review] (concluding that the military would be unable to “absorb a flood of 
inductees” in the event of a rapid and limited mobilization of the kind envisioned by 
military planners). 
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II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MODERN U.S. MILITARY 
The contemporary armed forces of the United States are not the 
armed forces that existed at the time of the Rostker decision.  World 
events, most notably the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
transformation of several Soviet satellite nations into U.S. allies or 
neutral countries,141 have dramatically altered U.S. military personnel 
planning.142  The Persian Gulf War and U.S. military actions in 
Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere demonstrate both 
superior U.S. weapons technology143 and an evolving approach to 
conflict that seeks to minimize direct and/or protracted involvement, 
and protects U.S. military personnel.144  The All Volunteer Force 
(AVF), which began in 1973 and was heavily criticized throughout 
that decade, has significantly improved its performance and image 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s.145  Since its introduction, the 
character and makeup of military personnel have evolved along with 
                                                          
 141. See, e.g., John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, The 
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 856 (2001) 
(discussing how “the Soviet Union gradually allowed its satellite nations to disavow 
communism [and ultimately] broke itself into fifteen independent states”).  See also 
András Balogh, The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security, in THE FUTURE OF 
NATO: ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 186, 188 (Charles-Philippe 
David & Jacques Lévesque eds., 1999) (noting the reduced influence Russia wields 
over former Soviet states).  Western Soviet peoples such as the Poles, Czechs, and 
Hungarians have historically been regarded more as part of Western Europe, and 
seek stability and security within that renewed association.  Id. at 186-187.   
 142. Compare NOEL E. FIRTH & JAMES H. NOREN, SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING: A 
HISTORY OF CIA ESTIMATES, 1950-1990, at 210-11 (1998) (reporting revised estimates 
that place Soviet armed forces personnel strength at just over 5,000,000 in 1988), 
with MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 47 (reporting current Russian active troop 
strength at just over one million).  See also Mazarr, supra note 31 (discussing the 
impact that the decline of Soviet military power—once the primary focus of the U.S. 
military—had on U.S. defense planning). 
 143. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 11 (noting the vastly superior 
position  held by the United States over its potential enemies in virtually every 
technologically related area of its military forces). 
 144. See id. at 9-10 (describing and analyzing the development of the post-Cold 
War military’s focus on rapid and limited deployment, and the tension between the 
need for troop presence and the desire to minimize casualties). See also id. at 50-53 
(reporting a total of 824 members of the U.S. armed forces killed in action since the 
United States withdrew from Vietnam).  
 145. See Eitelberg, supra note 22, at 67-69 (describing the initial failure of the AVF 
to attract quality recruits, eventually overcome by increased compensation and the 
military’s increasingly sophisticated approach both to recruiting and to maintaining 
an environment suited to a volunteer force).  While many reasons were given as to 
why recruitment surged, Eitelberg attributes the turnaround to “the fact that the 
armed services eventually became more experienced and more adept—along with 
Congress and manpower research and development complex—at operating an all-
volunteer environment.”  Id. at 68.  The recruiting improvement was so dramatic that 
studies commissioned in the early 1980s to examine AVF shortcomings were obsolete 
on completion.  Id. 
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military technology and strategy.146  The emphasis in the AVF is on 
attracting and retaining talented people to fill increasingly 
specialized roles in a smaller and more efficient military.147  The 
emphasis of today’s U.S. military spending is on superior weaponry 
operated by a qualified professional force.148 
A. Technology, Strategy, and Modern Warfare 
The Persian Gulf War ushered in a new era of technology-centered 
warfare, showcasing precision-guided munitions (“smart” bombs), 
stealth (radar evasion) technology, and other advances.149  President 
George H. W. Bush hailed these advances as demonstrating “a 
revolution in warfare.”150  This weaponry garnered a great deal of 
media attention,151 but was actually atypical of the type of bombs 
primarily used by the United States during the Gulf War.152  The 
                                                          
 146. See id. at 70-82 (charting the improved quality and aptitude of AVF recruits 
and a greater than five-fold increase in the percentage of personnel that are women, 
from 1973-1992). 
 147. Gordon R. Sullivan, The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years, in PROFESSIONALS 
ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 28, 31 (J. Eric 
Fredland et al. eds., 1996).  At the time of this writing, Sullivan was Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Army.  About the Editors and Contributors, PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: 
TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 325 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996). 
 148. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 9-10 (observing that current defense 
initiatives emphasize technologically advanced weapons and mobilization capabilities 
while expressing satisfaction with standing personnel).  See also William Niskanen, 
More Defense Spending for Smaller Forces: What Hath DoD Wrought? POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 
110, at 1 (July 29, 1988) (noting that in 1988, U.S. military spending adjusted for 
inflation was twenty percent higher than it was during the peak of the Vietnam war in 
1968, despite fielding a significantly smaller armed force), available at 
http://www.cato.org/ pubs/pas/pa110es.html.  
 149. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 97-101 (reviewing new weapons technology and 
characterizing it as the culmination of several decades of developments in war 
technology and assertions by military analysts that the art of war would soon be 
revolutionized).  
 150. Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony 
in Colorado Springs, Colorado (May 29, 1991), Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States: George Bush 1991 575, 576 (1992) (emphasizing lessons learned in 
the Persian Gulf War, including “the value of our power [and] . . . the value of 
stealth”), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91052900.html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2002). 
 151. See Hit Smarter, Not Harder? Gulf War Strikes Marked a Sea Change in Air Tactics, 
at http://www/cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/legacy/airstrikes (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2003) (discussing frequently broadcast videotape shot from the nose of a 
smart bomb, showing the bomb precisely striking an elevator shaft at the Iraqi Air 
Force communications building in Baghdad, and displaying a still from the footage) 
(on file with author). 
 152. See Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Impact Of Precision Weapons On Air Combat 
Operations, AIRPOWER J. (Summer 1993), at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 
airchronicles/apj/glosson.html (asserting that while inflicting nearly seventy-five 
percent of the damage, smart weapons actually only accounted for less than ten 
percent of the total number of bombs dropped by the United States in the Persian 
Gulf War) (on file with author).  See also MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN 
THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE 
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coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War,153 particularly the United 
States, illustrated how modern weapons technology could not only 
defeat an enemy, but could greatly reduce casualties to personnel.154 
While these advances in warfare technology were undeniably 
dramatic leaps forward, they also were part of an ongoing evolution 
among industrialized nations toward weapon-centered warfare.155  
Until recently, the history of warfare was illustrated primarily with the 
images of army-to-army confrontations,156 a type of warfare that results 
in tremendous loss of human life to both sides.157  Modern military 
strategy, however, has evolved such that large army-to-army 
confrontations are no longer the focus of U.S. defense strategy,158 
thereby extending it a great advantage through its emphasis on 
superior weapons technology.159  The Persian Gulf War was a 
watershed event for this evolution of military strategy that dates back 
to the 1950s and before.160 
                                                                                                                                      
LAWS OF WAR 114 (1991) [hereinafter MIDDLE EAST WATCH] (reporting the post-war 
disclosure that precision guided bombs accounted for only 8.8% of the more than 
84,000 tons of bombs dropped during the war). 
 153. See Steven R. Bowman, Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces, 
CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Feb. 11, 1991, at i-ii (calculating the initial U.S. strike 
force personnel at over 500,000, in addition to well over 200,000 personnel 
committed from the countries of Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, 
Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South 
Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom). 
 154. See Gulf War Facts: The Coalition, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/ 
gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2002) (noting that the combined 
coalition suffered 358 casualties, the U.S. forces suffered 293 of these deaths—145 of 
which were classified as non-battle related) (on file with author).  Figures on Iraqi 
casualties vary, but the minimum is thought to be approximately 100,000.  Id.  But cf. 
MAZARR, supra note 31, at 86 (describing pre-war estimates of allied casualties 
numbering between 8,000 and 16,000 and Iraqi casualties numbering 60,000). 
 155. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 259 (citing the examples of the massive German 
air assaults at the beginning of World War II and the American use of the atomic 
bomb at the war’s conclusion to illustrate the conquest of technology over traditional 
warfare). 
 156. See id. (characterizing confrontations between mass formations of troops as 
the traditional style of war through World War II). 
 157. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 209 (2001) (indicating that the 
wars in which the United States suffered the greatest number of deaths were the Civil 
War (498,333), World War I (116,708), and World War II (407,316)). 
 158. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 98 (characterizing the large armies that had 
been used in past wars as slow moving and vulnerable to attacks by smart weapons 
and mobile ground forces).  See also id. at 125-157 (describing the allied bombing 
campaign, which inflicted the bulk of the damage to Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf 
War prior to actual army-to-army confrontation, and the subsequent confrontation 
between Iraqi ground forces and highly mobile allied ground units that focused on 
hit-and-run strikes rather than protracted engagements). 
 159. See id. (discussing the bombing campaign and mobile allied attack against the 
Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf War, which resulted in a four-day ground campaign 
that culminated in an allied victory with few allied casualties). 
 160. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 259 (tracing the earliest predictions that mass 
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In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles introduced the “New 
Look” policy of defense strategy,161 which emphasized the threat of 
massive nuclear retaliation as a defensive strategy of deterrence 
against the Soviet Union.162  Massive mobilization of men for 
protracted campaigns was not a component of this strategy, which 
instead emphasized rapid retaliation by the standing forces.163 
The first major U.S. military conflict following the development of 
this philosophy, the Vietnam War, did not neatly fit the “New Look” 
policy.164  In this conflict, the United States committed millions of 
troops over a fourteen-year period and lost well over 50,000 American 
lives.165  During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces were largely supplied 
through the use of the draft,166 despite sufficient draft-age manpower 
to form an AVF.167  Although there was a large military reserve force,168 
it went largely unused,169 and the continued idleness of this force 
                                                                                                                                      
armies would become obsolete as air war and the use of tactical weapons would 
become the main methods of waging war). 
 161. See SAKI DOCKRILL, EISENHOWER’S NEW LOOK NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1953-
61 xv (1996) (acknowledging Dulles’s central role in formulating the New Look 
policy, but asserting that President Eisenhower was more important in its 
formulation). 
 162. See id. at xii-xvi, 1-5 (indicating that the New Look policy was centered on 
superior technology instead of large armies in conflict, and it also included covert 
operations, diplomacy, alliances, and foreign military aid). 
 163. See HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 93 (1957) 
(furthering Dulles’s “New Look” concept by asserting that air war or strategic strikes, 
rather than protracted ground campaigns, would characterize future large-scale 
military involvements). 
 164. See United States Army Center of Military History, The Army and the New Look, 
in AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 572, 579-80, at http://www.army.mil/cmh-
pg/books/amh/AMH-26.htm (updated Apr. 27, 2001) (describing the growth of the 
conflict in Vietnam between Communist guerilla forces sponsored by the Soviet 
Union and South Vietnamese forces sponsored by the United States, and the context 
of conflicts around the world in which the two superpowers sponsored factions but 
did not engage directly, precluding employment of “New Look” components) (on 
file with author). 
 165. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 47 (reporting the total number of 
U.S. armed services personnel serving in Vietnam as 8,752,000, during the years 
1961-1975, with 58,198 Americans killed in action).  By way of comparison, casualties, 
including dead, wounded, and missing, during the three-day Battle of Gettysburg in 
the American Civil War totaled more than 50,000.  CRAIG SYMONDS, A BATTLEFIELD 
ATLAS OF THE CIVIL WAR 67 (1983). 
 166. See CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 268 (reporting that sixty percent of enlisted 
personnel in 1966 were draftees and that an estimated forty to sixty percent of 
volunteers were influenced by the draft in their decision to enlist). 
 167. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 228 (stating that the “huge total of 18 year olds 
[669,000] suggested that it would be possible to recruit an AVF”). 
 168. See Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force 99 (1970) 
[hereinafter “Gates Commission”] (reporting a reserve force of over 3.25 million 
men as of June, 1969, over 2.6 million of which were enlisted men).  Of these 
enlisted men, however, approximately seventy-five percent enlisted to avoid the draft.  
Id. at 97. 
 169. See LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: 
THE DRAFT, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 50 (1978) (characterizing 
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reduced the confidence of military planners.170  In contrast to earlier 
U.S. wars, the Vietnam War was characterized by small unit actions 
rather than large battles.171  These ground troop confrontations were 
coupled with massive bombing against an enemy greatly inferior in 
size.172  Nuclear weapons were never a serious option in Vietnam,173 
and the elusive and insurgent nature of the enemy guerilla forces 
made strategic bombing problematic.174 
The increased U.S. reliance on air power in Vietnam was clear, 
however, as the Air Force alone dropped 6,162,000 tons of bombs 
during the war,175 compared with 2,150,000 tons dropped during 
World War II.176  The reliance on draftees was likewise apparent, as 
Selective Service conscripted over two million people during the 
Vietnam War.177  The loss of American lives in Vietnam, while 
                                                                                                                                      
President Johnson’s reluctance to deploy reserve troops as a political tactic intended 
to support the appearance that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was limited). 
 170. See Kenneth J. Coffey, Our Nation’s Reserve Forces: Where Do We Go From Here?, in 
PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 99, 
100-01 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) (stating that the “credibility and the overall 
effectiveness of the guard and reserves suffered badly during this period”). 
 171. See CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 241 (noting that, in contrast to World War 
II and the Korean War, most U.S. casualties in the Vietnam War came at the hands of 
the enemy infantry, rather than from ordnance as is typical of larger-scale 
confrontations).  
 172. See id. at 238 (1995) (placing U.S. force strength in Vietnam in 1967 at 
473,000, compared with an estimated enemy ground force of 63,000, but noting that 
the actual ground combat forces for the United States numbered less than 50,000). 
 173. See Morris Janowitz, Beyond Deterrence: Alternative Conceptual Dimensions, in THE 
LIMITS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 369, 378-379 (Ellen P. Stern ed., 1977) (asserting 
that use of tactical nuclear weapons had been considered in support of French 
Indochinese interests, but strategic U.S. involvement after the French withdraw 
centered on conventional bombing in an effort to avoid “disaster in the world 
community”). 
 174. See id. (asserting that the initial sustained U.S. bombing was of limited 
effectiveness, but subsequent improved bombing accuracy helped bring about an 
eventual cease-fire). 
 175. See HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., VIETNAM WAR ALMANAC 100 (1985) (noting that 
“considerable” Navy and Marine Corps bombing is excluded from the six million ton 
figure attributed to the Air Force). 
 176. Id.; see also THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OVER-ALL REPORT x 
tbl. 1 (1945) (placing the total bomb tonnage dropped in Europe alone by the 
combined U.S.-British forces at nearly 2.7 million tons).  The bombing increased in 
the latter stages of both wars.  See JEFFREY D. GLASSER, THE SECRET VIETNAM WAR: THE 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN THAILAND, 1961-1975, at 108 (1995) (noting that 
approximately halfway through the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, U.S. 
forces dropped only one-quarter of their eventual total tonnage).  In World War II, 
over sixty percent of the total bombs dropped by the allies in Europe fell in the last 
ten months of the war.  MARK CLODFELTER, THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER: THE AMERICAN 
BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM 8 (1989); see also U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, THE UNITED 
STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OVER-ALL REPORT (EUROPEAN WAR) 6-8 (1945) 
(illustrating through graphs the dramatic increase in allied bombing toward the 
conclusion of World War II).  
 177. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting yearly Selective Service 
induction statistics for the years 1964 and 1973, the start and end of the draft, 
including a high of 382,010 in 1966). 
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significant, was a fraction of the millions of fatalities.178  In this regard, 
the war was an indication of future U.S. military strategy emphasizing 
limited commitment of resources and minimized risk to U.S. 
personnel.179 
The Persian Gulf War, the only major U.S. military conflict since 
Vietnam,180 was the first major conflict fought without conscripts since 
the Spanish-American War.181  In the first real test of the AVF, a 
strategic bombing campaign was followed by a ground campaign that 
claimed victory after only four days of fighting.182  This strategy 
minimized the risk to U.S. personnel by inflicting immense damage 
on Iraqi forces with bombs and missiles, before meeting the Iraqi 
forces on the field of battle.183  In the hands of an enemy such as Iraq, 
similar advanced weaponry put U.S. forces at risk and extended the 
concept of harm’s way beyond the front lines of the battlefield.184  
Although U.S. forces in such a scenario are now at risk far behind the 
front lines, an examination of U.S. war casualties shows a dramatic 
decline in deaths as a percent of total participants, culminating in 
minimal Allied casualties in the Gulf War.185 
                                                          
 178. See News Release, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, at http://www.rjsmith.com/ 
kia_tbl.html#press (Apr. 3, 1995) (reporting Vietnamese government estimates, 
released on the twentieth anniversary of the official end of the Vietnam War, that 
approximately four million Vietnamese civilians and more than one million 
combatants died as a result of war during the years 1954-1975) (on file with author).  
 179. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (surveying technological 
advances in warfare that were long in development and finally widely and successfully 
employed by the United States in the Persian Gulf War). 
 180. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 50-53 (listing eighty-nine selected 
U.S. military actions between 1975 and 2001, with no other operation approaching 
the enormity of Operation Desert Storm). 
 181. See Induction Statistics, supra note 46 (reporting numbers of men entering the 
military through the Selective Service System during World War I, World War II, the 
Korean War and the Vietnam War).  See also CHAMBERS, supra note 69, at 136-38 
(suggesting that a primary reason President Wilson instituted the draft in World War 
I was to prevent political rival Theodore Roosevelt from raising and leading a 
volunteer army as Roosevelt had in the Spanish American War). 
 182. See generally MAZARR, supra note 31, at 125-57 (narrating the brief and decisive 
allied ground campaign in the Gulf War). 
 183. See id. at 99 (describing the near-total destruction of Iraqi forces before the 
Allied ground forces confronted the Iraqi army). 
 184. See Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed 
Forces, Report to the President, 93 (GPO 1992) (observing that the transformation of 
modern warfare has resulted in greater combatant mobility and fluidity of action 
which, coupled with the advances in the accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry, 
have undermined the traditional concept of front-line combat). 
 185. See Statistical Summary of America’s Major Wars, at http://www.cwc. 
lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm (last modified June 13, 2001) (comparing 
casualty ratios in American wars on a per month of war basis, with an approximate 
steady rise in deaths peaking at World War II, and steadily declining to the Persian 
Gulf War’s lowest rate of U.S. casualties per month since the Mexican-American War) 
(on file with author). 
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The Persian Gulf War likely signaled the end of U.S. involvement 
in major ground-troop confrontations.186  The decisive defeat of the 
Iraqi army demonstrated how U.S. superiority in virtually all areas of 
the military arts allowed the U.S.-led forces to defeat a much larger 
Iraqi army by employing mobile forces.187  The U.S. armed forces and 
the American public were justifiably impressed with this illustration of 
a new type of war188 emphasizing rapid strategic response, 
containment, coalition building, and setting limited goals.189 
After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, U.S. military strategy 
underwent further revision.190  The United States’ once great military 
foe was reduced to smaller, poorly trained and poorly equipped 
armies.191  With no military equal, the United States reduced the size 
                                                          
 186. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 98 (likening the U.S. operation in the Persian 
Gulf to high-tech guerilla warfare, and suggesting that the armies attempting to fight 
“static linear wars” would become obsolete in much the same way as the cavalry as 
used against the German advance in World War II). 
 187. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (chronicling the pre-assault 
bombing and subsequent swift ground war victory of the allied forces). See also 
MAZARR, supra note 31, at 131-32 (placing the size of the defending Iraqi army at 
approximately 500,000 and the size of the allied army at approximately  250,000). 
 188. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing public perceptions 
of the advanced weapon technology used in the Persian Gulf War).  But see generally 
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING 
THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 152, at 113-28 
(discussing the frequent inaccuracy of precision bombing and the fact that most 
bombing was not precision bombing, despite the impression conveyed to the public 
by the Pentagon and Bush Administration in an orchestrated media relations effort 
to promote the success and use of these weapons).  After the Gulf War’s conclusion, 
allegations and evidence surfaced of bombs missing targets and hitting civilians 
instead. Id.  Ten years later, similar reports surfaced after the United States military 
involvement in Afghanistan.  See Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds 
Dead: Faulty Intelligence and Overwhelming Force Are Seen as Factors in Afghan Toll, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting a pattern of air strike mistakes that took as 
many as 400 Afghani civilian lives in eleven locations). 
 189. See MAZURR, supra note 31, at 161-63 (referring to the Persian Gulf War as a 
“test case of [the] post-cold war concepts” in which the United States would maintain 
regional stability throughout the world by leading rapid, cooperative deployments of 
limited duration);  DENNIS MENOS, ARMS OVER DIPLOMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PERSIAN GULF WAR 84 (1992) (contrasting the success of the allied coalition during 
the Persian Gulf War with the failure of the United States’ protracted and essentially 
non-cooperative campaign during the Vietnam War).  But see id. at 86-87 (crediting 
public relations, exaggeration of Iraqi troop strength, and military control of 
operations for much of the overwhelming victory, and suggesting that Americans 
were deceived by an image of a masterful victory when in fact the Allied forces 
defeated a poorly equipped army and inflicted large amounts of immediate and 
long-lasting losses on Iraqi civilians); MAZARR, supra note 31, at 166-67 (noting that 
the strategic reason for high-technology weapons, which was not based on limiting 
U.S. casualties, may have shifted public opposition). 
 190. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 9-10 (describing the transformation 
of the U.S. military, which focused primarily on the Soviet Union, an opponent of 
approximately equal military strength, during the Cold War). 
 191. See MAZARR, supra note 31, at 5-12 (discussing the shift in the focus of U.S. 
defense priorities from a singular enemy superpower to a variety of potential 
regional conflicts). 
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of the AVF by nearly twenty-five percent between 1992 and 2000.192  
Even with the post-Cold War reduction in force, the United States 
maintains a standing armed force of nearly 1.4 million persons, the 
second largest standing army in the world after China’s 2.5 million.193  
Mutual agreements between various allies assure adequate forces 
should conflicts with foreseeable enemies arise.194  The lessons 
learned in the Persian Gulf War have been applied to a post-Cold 
War world of unrivaled U.S. military power and are reflected in the 
current strategic planning of the armed forces.195  To better react to 
escalating regional developments, the current planning emphasizes 
rapid deployment of smaller forces and strategic placement and use 
of air and naval forces.196  The increasing success of the AVF and the 
increased confidence of the military leaders in the AVF have been 
major components in this change in strategy.197  The issue of the draft 
rarely comes up at all and does not appear to be a part of modern 
military strategy or analysis.198   
                                                          
 192. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 21. 
 193. See id. at 11 (providing a chart entitled “Military Strengths of U.S., Allied, and 
Selected Other Armed Forces”). 
 194. See id. (reporting the number of active and reserve United States and allied 
troops, primarily South Korean and NATO, to be over fourteen million, compared to 
the fewer than 8.5 million maintained by potential enemies, as defined by the 
Department of Defense as including Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, 
and Syria, all with lower capabilities in virtually all areas of defense, including 
communications, intelligence, and training).  See also id. at 61-64 (surveying the 
mutual security agreements affecting Europe and Asia which the U.S. is a party to or 
which augment U.S.-involved security guarantees).   
 195. See id. at 9-10 (describing the move in the armed forces’ four branches and 
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward mobility, flexibility, greater technological 
superiority in weaponry, transportation and communications, and increased allied 
operations). 
 196. See id. at 9 (noting the Army’s goal to mobilize five standing divisions 
anywhere in the world within thirty days as an example of the current emphasis in 
defense planning on anticipatory or rapid response to regional trouble spots).  
 197. See Jim Garamone, DoD Celebrates 25 Years of the All Volunteer Force, Am. Forces 
Press Serv., at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998/n07101998_ 9807096.html 
(last visited July 18, 2002) (quoting Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, “[the 
AVF] is far more professional, more stable, largely married, and [it] reflects 
America,” and Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy deLeon 
“[the AVF] is widely regarded as the most capable and professional force in the 
world . . . [i]t is the model for militaries around the world . . . [it] won the Cold War 
and has met every challenge since”) (on file with author). 
 198. See generally MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24 (containing eighty pages of 
analysis of present and future military challenges, with no mention of conscription, 
registration, or any related topic); JOHN JESSUP, A CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND 
RESOLUTION, 1945-1985 (1989) (chronicling U.S.-Soviet relations in a detailed 838-
page political timeline, without mentioning the U.S. imposition of draft registration 
in 1980, though President Carter presented the imposition as necessary to send a 
significant statement to the Soviets).  A search of the DoD website finds the draft or 
registration mentioned only in historical context, in reference to enlisted men’s 
obligation to register, or as part of recruiting campaigns coordinated with Selective 
Service mailings. 
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B. The All-Volunteer Force 
The AVF as it exists today dates to 1973, but for most of U.S. 
history, the federal armed forces have been a volunteer force.199  In 
fact, the United States has used a military draft in only thirty-seven 
years, primarily between 1940 and 1973.200  The AVF is characterized 
as a smaller, more career-oriented, better trained, and better 
qualified force intended to serve modern U.S. military needs without 
the aid of drafted troops.201  The current AVF grew out of a variety of 
influences, some older than the draft it replaced.202  Questions about 
fair application of the draft arose increasingly during the Vietnam 
War as a result of flexible deferment and qualification standards.203  
As general opposition to the Vietnam War grew, so did opposition to 
the draft, which was seen as making the war possible.204 
Major opposition to the draft came from a group of libertarian-
leaning Republican members of Congress, including Barry 
Goldwater, who argued in 1963 that conscription both contradicted 
the concept of liberty and encouraged inefficient personnel 
management.205  President Johnson successfully opposed these 
                                                          
 199. See COOPER, supra note 49, at 46 (stating that the United States has only 
resorted to conscription during approximately thirty-five years of its existence).  
 200. See THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION endpages 
(Martin Anderson et al. eds., 1982) (providing a timeline entitled “Wars and 
Conscription”). 
 201. See Walter Y. Oi, Historical Perspectives on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester 
Connection, in PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO DECADES OF THE ALL-
VOLUNTEER ARMY 38, 49 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) (noting the changed 
demands upon U.S. armed forces and the increased need for highly skilled 
personnel, which resulted in a better-compensated and smaller AVF). 
 202. See id. at 40 (describing conscription practices just before World War II where 
exemptions were granted to “farmers, fathers, and conscientious objectors,” and 
African Americans were underrepresented perhaps due to segregationist practices, 
which would require separate African American officers). 
 203. See id. at 41 (pointing to a rise in draft age population that allowed draft 
boards to raise minimum standards and more liberally grant deferments).  That so 
much discretion was granted to draft boards, who served on an entirely voluntary 
basis, eventually resulted in charges of favoritism, and indeed certain groups, 
including African-Americans, bore a disproportionate share of the defense burden.  
Id.; see also FLYNN, supra note 48, at 205-06 (asserting that opposition to the Vietnam 
War among African Americans grew as they discovered that young African American 
men were much more likely to be drafted than population percentages would 
otherwise suggest); STEPHAN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS, 1658-1985, at 79-82 (1986) (discussing minority opposition to 
the Vietnam war and the lack of minority representation in the selection process). 
 204. Oi, supra note 201, at 42  See generally KOHN, supra note 203, at 73-99 
(chronicling the inextricably linked issues of opposition to war and opposition to 
conscription). 
 205. See Oi, supra note 201, at 41-42 (noting that these critics argued that the draft 
saved money on salaries in the short term, while losing money in the long term 
through turnover of personnel and expensive retraining); see also FLYNN, supra note 
48, at 189 (describing a study of the draft called for in 1964 by President Lyndon 
Johnson as a response to opposition to the draft from his Republican presidential 
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Congress members’ efforts to launch a study of the draft that focused 
on economic and liberty issues by producing his own study.206  
Johnson’s study, however, was not completed until 1965 and was not 
released for another year.207  A growing number of voices, including 
civil rights advocates, conscientious objectors, Libertarians, 
Republicans, and Democrats, forced increasing attention to the issue 
of the draft.208  As the 1968 presidential elections approached, 
candidates voiced their opinions on the draft issue to U.S. voters.209  
Among those opposed to conscription were former Vice President 
Richard M. Nixon, who made his opposition part of his 1968 
presidential campaign.210 
Nixon defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 
presidential election,211 aided in part by voter discontent over the 
general conduct of the war by the Johnson Administration212 and 
possibly over the draft as well.213  Nixon followed through on his 
                                                                                                                                      
rival, Barry Goldwater and noting that the study offered little hope of curing 
problems with the draft). 
 206. Oi, supra note 201, at 41-42. 
 207. Id. at 42. 
 208. See generally FLYNN, supra note 48, at 188-223 (chronicling opposition to the 
draft, based on legal, moral, economic, social and political concerns, voiced by a 
varied and expanding array of special interest groups between the 1964 and 1968 
presidential elections).  While opposition to the draft came from a broad section of 
the U.S. political and social spectrum, the draft was not always widely unpopular 
during the Vietnam War. See id. at 219 (reporting several polls and surveys that 
indicated general popular support of the draft in the years 1967-68). 
 209. See id. at 225 (describing the varying degrees to which politicians Eugene 
McCarthy, George Wallace, Nelson Rockefeller, Hubert Humphrey, and Richard 
Nixon incorporated discontent over the draft into their campaign platforms).  
 210. See Richard M. Nixon, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, in THE MILITARY DRAFT: 
SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 603-08 (Martin Anderson & Barbara Honegger 
eds., 1982) (pledging to end the military draft at the conclusion of the Vietnam 
War).  But see RICHARD NIXON, THE REAL WAR 201 (1980) (reconsidering his 
opposition to a draft in light of perceived AVF failures).  The contrast between 
Nixon’s two views on the draft reveals the political motives dictating his positions.  See 
FLYNN, supra note 48, at 225 (asserting that Nixon’s vocal opposition to the draft 
developed as part of his political comeback after losing the 1960 presidential election 
and the 1962 California governor’s race).  While this position may have evolved for 
Nixon, it was not incompatible with the views of many Republicans.  Id.; see also Oi, 
supra note 201, at 41 (noting that twenty-four House Republicans were also pressing 
for draft reform in 1964). 
 211. See Dean Blobaum, Chicago ‘68: A Chronology, at http://www.geocities.com/ 
Athens/Delphi/1553/c68chron.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2003) (describing the 
events in 1967-68 which led the Democratic Party to nominate Hubert Humphrey 
rather than President Johnson as its candidate in the 1968 election, and noting role 
of the “Dump Johnson” movement, which was dedicated to putting forth a candidate 
committed to ending the Vietnam War) (on file with author). 
 212. See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 236 (noting Nixon’s recognition of the broad 
discontent stemming from the Vietnam War, for which the draft stood as a symbol). 
 213. See Martin Binkin, Commentary, in PROFESSIONALS ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO 
DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 124, 124 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) 
(asserting Nixon’s anti-draft strategy was as much an instrument to gain the 
presidency as it was an expression of political ideology).  Binkin calls the AVF one of 
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commitment to create the AVF by appointing the President’s 
Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission), 
chaired by former Defense Secretary Thomas Gates.214  In February 
1970, the Gates Commission issued its report, containing views on 
conscription versus an AVF and budgetary and management 
recommendations for the implementation of an effective AVF.215  The 
report’s findings reprised the assertions of Goldwater and other draft 
critics that past comparisons of conscription versus an AVF had not 
accounted for all costs when concluding that conscription was more 
economical.216  Among the report’s recommendations were: 
(1) reconsideration of the importance of reserve forces;217 (2) reform 
of military pay to better recruit volunteers;218 (3) a restructuring of 
ground force personnel;219 and (4) maintenance of registration for a 
standby draft.220  The implementation of these recommendations 
                                                                                                                                      
Nixon’s “few positive legacies,” but stops short of asserting that it actually helped him 
win the election.  Id.  It is unclear how great a role Nixon’s position on the draft 
actually played in the election.  See FLYNN, supra note 48, at 226 (contending that 
voters surveyed did not indicate a popular discontent with the draft).  Regardless, 
Nixon’s victory carried the AVF concept into office with him.  See id. at 236-41 
(asserting that Nixon’s continuing interest in reforming and eventually eliminating 
the draft after he took office was tied to his desire to both pacify a discontent over 
the Vietnam War and court draft age men as supporters of Nixon and the 
Republican Party). 
 214. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at vii (naming Gates as Chairman of 
the Advisory Committee of the AVF). 
 215. Id.; see also Studies Prepared for the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer 
Armed Force (1970) (containing studies prepared for the Commission upon which the 
Commission’s recommendations were largely based). 
 216. Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 28.  The report further pointed to 
various economic costs tied to drafting young men, such as preventing them from 
contributing to the economy, disrupting careers, or forcing career and life choices to 
avoid conscription.  See id. at 30-33 (noting that the draft also causes unnecessary 
problems for the military by creating low morale among troops). 
 217. See id. at 40 (observing that reservists were underutilized during the Vietnam 
War); see also Martin Anderson, The All-Volunteer Force Decision, History and Prospects, in 
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 10, 13 
(William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (emphasizing that a well trained and equipped 
armed forces reserve and National Guard prepared to fight is a far more effective 
means of improving military combat readiness). 
 218. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 49 (maintaining that compensation 
levels in the early years of military service are too low to attract quality recruits); see 
also Oi, supra note 201, at 45-46 (asserting that Congress’s power to conscript at 
below market rates kept pay for the first two years of service, the legal maximum term 
of conscription, artificially low and therefore imposed a “hidden tax” on young men 
to the benefit of other citizens—particularly the wealthy). 
 219. See Gates Commission, supra note 168, at 36-37 (noting that the ground-force 
centered Army had grown during the Vietnam War, as a percentage of the armed 
forces as a whole, and that most draftees entered the Army).  Because the Navy and 
Marines rarely had to resort to a draft and the Air Force never did, most experts 
predicted that maintaining Army ground forces would present the greatest challenge 
for recruiters in an AVF.  Id. 
 220. See id. at 119-22 (offering the first credible plan for registration without a 
draft). 
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would figure prominently in subsequent analysis of the successes and 
failures of the AVF.221 
Based upon the Gates Commission’s recommendations, Congress 
passed a bill222 extending the draft until the anticipated end of the 
Vietnam War223 and amending the military pay scale in anticipation of 
the AVF.224  Unfortunately, the AVF was not initiated in a particularly 
supportive atmosphere, having barely overcome strong opposition 
from a vocal minority in Congress.225  In addition, the initial reaction 
to the AVF from the existing military establishment ranged from 
tepid to openly hostile,226 while the general public held the military 
itself in low regard in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.227 
During the 1970s, as the AVF struggled to compete against a strong 
job market, Congress failed to improve pay for entering recruits and 
ended GI Bill benefits.228  In an attempt to meet its recruitment 
goals,229 the AVF was forced to reduce recruitment standards,230 which 
                                                          
 221. See MELVIN LAIRD, PEOPLE, NOT HARDWARE: THE HIGHEST DEFENSE PRIORITY 1 
(1980) (discussing the negative effect on recruiting and retention of quality forces 
caused by congressional and executive failure to fully implement the Gates 
Commission’s proposals for pay increases). 
 222. See Act of May 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, 81 Stat. 649 (1971); see also 
COOPER, supra note 49, at 109 (describing how a compromise between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate was reached despite large discrepancies in the 
amount of funding each House wanted to provide for military pay raises). 
 223. Act of May 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, Title I, § 101(9)(d)-(e), 81 Stat. 649, 
1439, 1466 (1971).  
 224. See id.  § 202(a), 81 Stat. 649, 1439, 1471 (granting significant pay raises at the 
lowest ranks of the military); see also LAIRD, supra note 221, at 20-22 (demonstrating 
that between 1973 and 1981, service pay declined by twenty-five percent in 
comparison to minimum wage and by fifteen percent in comparison with the 
Consumer Price Index).  The author of this study, Melvin Laird, served as Secretary 
of Defense under Nixon during the transition from drafted forces to the AVF.  Id. at 
1. 
 225. See Anderson, supra note 217, at 11 (pointing out that many political leaders 
opposed the formation of the AVF, and noting that criticism from Congress 
continued through the AVF’s first decade of existence). 
 226. See id. (asserting that the AVF was opposed by most senior military leaders); 
see also LAIRD, supra note 221, at 2-3 (criticizing the military establishment for 
focusing on hardware and technology to the detriment of the AVF); Charles Moskos 
& Paul Glastris, To Secure and Reassure: This Time a Draft for the Home Front, Too, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at B1 (characterizing the military’s general resistance to change 
as the cause of its resistance to the end of the draft in 1973 and its resistance to the 
current calls for the end of the AVF). 
 227. See George C. Herring, Preparing Not to Refight the Last War: The Impact of the 
Vietnam War on the U.S. Military, in AFTER VIETNAM: LEGACIES OF A LOST WAR 56, 58 
(Charles E. Neu ed., 2000) (describing the effect that the publicly unpopular war 
had on the image of the military, both to outsiders and to the military itself). 
 228. See Gary R. Nelson, The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees Under the All-
Volunteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECT 21, 48 (William Bowman et al. eds., 1986) (concluding that the 1976 
elimination of the G.I. Bill, the general failure of military pay to keep pace with 
civilian pay, and rising employment rates created a personnel shortage in the 1970s).  
 229. See Eitelberg, supra note 22, at 71 (observing that enlistment targets are based 
on both military and budgetary factors).   
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was followed by increased drug use by military personnel, reduced 
morale, and negative publicity.231  Despite calls for the resumption of 
a draft, supporters of the AVF contended that its shortcomings were 
attributable to the failure to adequately raise pay.232  Eventually, 
Congress authorized funds for increased pay, benefits, and 
recruiting.233 
By the early 1980s, the AVF had raised its standards,234 and it has 
met or exceeded its quota almost every year for the past decade.235  
The recruiting renaissance in the 1980s provided the active and 
reserve forces that conducted the Persian Gulf War.236  One indication 
of how well the AVF performed overall is the fact that from 1990-
2000, the military failed to meet its enlistment requirements only 
twice, in 1998 and 1999,237 and even then by a margin of less than 
four percent.238  The following year, the military easily met its 
enlistment quota despite increasing the size of the quota.239 
The AVF has consistently filled or nearly filled its ranks, despite a 
congressional reluctance to recognize that the military must compete 
                                                                                                                                      
 230. See Nelson, supra note 228, at 37 (characterizing the rise and fall of 
recruitment standards with the rise and fall of available personnel as a logical result 
of the military competing for labor in a free market). 
 231. See id. at 67 (characterizing the AVF as being “on the brink of disaster” at this 
time).  But see Herring, supra note 227, at 59-60 (ascribing these trends to the 
declining fortunes of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam). 
 232. See Milton Friedman, Argument Against National Service (Rebuttal), in 
REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOOVER-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE 
ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, 189, 190 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982) (blaming the 
low number of enlisted soldiers on the failure of Congress to implement the Gates 
Commission’s recommendations for increased pay). 
 233. See Dorn, supra note 22, at 18 (referencing pay raises of 11.1% in 1981 and 
14.3% in 1982). 
 234. Id. at 20 (noting that in 1973 only sixty-six percent of enlisted men had a 
high school degree, but in 1994 that number was ninety-six percent, and tying this 
rise in quality to rises in pay and recruiting budgets in the early 1980s, which allowed 
for greater selectivity in recruiting).  
 235. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24 (listing a quota satisfaction rate of 
100 percent or greater every year from 1990-2001, except 1998 and 1999). 
 236. See Neil M. Singer, Commentary, PROFESSIONAL ON THE FRONT LINE: TWO 
DECADES OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 211 (J. Eric Fredland et al. eds., 1996) 
(observing the success with which the AVF and reserves conducted the Persian Gulf 
War, while acknowledging that recruitment would be an ongoing issue). 
 237. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24 (reporting personnel recruiting 
shortfalls of 6,167 in 1998 and 7,912 in 1999).  As a result of these shortfalls, some in 
Congress called for a revival of the draft.  See Military Draft No Solution, CAPITAL TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 1999, at 8A (reporting Sen. Strom Thurmond’s suggestion that the draft 
might need to be revived to offset recruiting shortfalls).  Additionally, some military 
recruiters expressed misgivings with the AVF.  See Bradley Graham, The Bugle Sounds 
But Fewer Answer; Services Rethink Recruiting as Ranks Thin, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1999, 
at A3 (discussing the dilemma facing military recruiters in trying to interest young 
men in the military over other competing paths and interests). 
 238. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 24. 
 239. Id. 
KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:09 PM 
2003] SELECTIVE DISSERVICE 735 
in the job market for personnel.240  This reluctance has led to 
inconsistent funding for pay and recruiting.241  The need for an 
enhanced pay scale that compensates more for skill and merit than 
for time served is an ongoing issue.242  The complex demands of the 
modern U.S. military require not only more selectivity regarding 
personnel, but also the ability to retain such personnel for longer 
periods than a draft would allow.243  It is difficult to conceive of the 
military taking a step backward from this position.244 
C. Women in the All-Volunteer Force 
Between 1973, the first year of the AVF, and the 1981 Rostker 
decision, women as a percentage of the U.S. armed forces rose from 
2.5% to 8.9%.245  By 1998, that figure reached over fourteen 
percent.246  Despite the Rostker Court’s insinuation that women were a 
marginal element in the military,247 women are an integral part of the 
current AVF and, through their numbers and contributions, are part 
of the reason that registration is no longer needed.248  The Persian 
                                                          
 240. See BANDOW, supra note 50, at 126-29 (reviewing the general disagreement 
about how best to improve recruiting through equity in military pay).  Congress 
often provides additional funds for pay increases only after the military reports 
drastic shortfalls in certain military professions.  See id. at 129 (describing 
congressional appropriations in reaction to low retention rates for pilots and military 
personnel). 
 241. See COOPER, supra note 49, at 392 (characterizing military pay historically as a 
“patchwork” system resulting in relatively high pay for officers and relatively low pay 
for enlisted men); see also MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 27 (reporting military 
entry level salary in 2001 as $16,620).  
 242. See Oi, supra note 201, at 49-50 (calling for a more flexible system of pay, job 
descriptions, and promotions designed to attract skilled personnel and retain them 
beyond the military’s traditional twenty-year career). 
 243. See id. at 48-49 (emphasizing the changes in technology utilized by the 
modern military that make age, physical strength, and stamina less important than 
specialized training). 
 244. See id. at 49 (asserting that the former image of military personnel as 
common laborers is as outdated as the military draft is obsolete). 
 245. Binkin & Eitelberg, supra note 111, at 83. 
 246. United States Department of Defense, Active Duty Strength Male/Female for 
September 1998, at http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms5.pdf (last visited Feb. 
5, 2003) (stating that as of September 1998 the Marine Corps consisted of 5.65% 
women, the Navy 13.26%, the Army 14.83%,  and the Air Force 18%). 
 247. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 
prohibition against women in combat, coupled with the possibility that all personnel 
may at some point need to fight, severely limits the use of women in the military).  
 248. See William L. O’Neill, Women and Readiness, in WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 172, 
180 (Rita James Simon ed., 2001) (articulating the DoD position that defense 
readiness is enhanced by opening up more positions to women).  Women are more 
likely than men to request support positions rather than the combat positions that 
are open to them.  Id. at 173.  This issue, however, has not been a problem for DoD 
or prevalent in the public debate. Id.  Where the Rostker Court accepted the 
government’s position that the contribution of women to the military was limited by 
restrictions against women in combat, DoD simply enlists women for the positions 
that the women choose and that they are permitted to fill.  Id. 
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Gulf War not only highlighted the role of women in the AVF 
generally, it also showed why traditional notions of women in combat 
roles are less relevant in the modern style of U.S. warfare.249  The 
American public’s notions of the limitations of women in war also 
have undergone a significant transformation.250  Following the war, a 
variety of polls showed that the majority of Americans believe women 
should be allowed a greater role in the U.S. armed forces, including 
serving in combat positions.251 
In 1994, the military retired the “Risk Rule” that defined positions 
in the military that excluded women based upon the position’s 
proximity to combat,252 and replaced it with a rule that barred women 
only from direct ground combat.253  Women are now permitted in 
more than ninety percent of all job categories in all branches of the 
armed services.254  The actual number of jobs available to women is 
heavily tied to the ground combat exclusion rule and the relative 
level of ground-combat engagement for each branch of service.255  
The Rostker Court regarded women as outsiders to the military,256 yet 
women now account for approximately one-seventh of the AVF,257 
indicating that it is time to rethink the Court’s assumptions. 
                                                          
 249. See James Milko, Beyond the Persian Gulf Crisis: Expanding the Role of 
Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1301, 1315-17 (1992) 
(noting that the reach of modern weaponry blurs the lines between combatants and 
support personnel, resulting in a greater integration of participating women into any 
military operation, and that modern U.S. warfare strategy is much less ground-
combat centered). 
 250. See id. at 1322-23 (discussing how the public’s opinion of women in combat 
was transformed by female participation in the Persian Gulf War and the public’s 
evolving views on the issue as influencing the liberalization of combat exclusion 
rules). 
 251. See, e.g., id. at 1323 (reporting a post-Gulf War Gallup poll finding seventy-
nine percent of Americans supported the opening of combat roles to women).  
 252. See Fenner, supra note 113, at 13 (asserting that the end of the “Risk Rule” 
merely acknowledged a long-standing military practice of ignoring the rule when 
military need dictated otherwise). 
 253. See  Aspin, supra note 133 (stating that “[s]ervice members are eligible to be 
assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be 
excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is 
to engage in direct combat on the ground . . . .”). 
 254. Mady W. Segal et al., Gender and the Propensity to Enlist in the U.S. Military, in 
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 49, 49 (Rita James Simon ed., 2001). 
 255. Id. (noting that sixty-two percent of positions in the Marine Corps are open 
to female service members, followed by seventy percent in the Army, ninety-four 
percent in the Navy, and ninety-nine percent in the U.S. Air Force). 
 256. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (tying the eligibility of women 
to participate in the military to their participation in combat, which was prohibited 
by law and regulations).  
 257. MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24. 
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III. REGISTRATION SERVES NO LEGITIMATE DEFENSE INTEREST 
The existence of the Selective Service System without a draft will 
soon enter its thirtieth year.258  Since 1980, its activities have cost over 
$500 million.259  Active registration has been in place for over twenty 
years, but Selective Service reported compliance levels of eighty-eight 
percent in 2001—well below its all-time high of ninety-seven percent 
immediately following the Persian Gulf War.260  It is doubtful that 
Selective Service contributes significantly to national security, even 
though it is asserted that Selective Service operates insurance policy 
against undetermined threats.261  In fact, President Clinton raised the 
issue of Selective Service playing the role of insurance against vague 
and unforeseen threats.262  In making this assertion, Clinton rejected 
the advice of his own DoD that elimination of the draft would not 
hinder military preparedness.263 
If registration makes no legitimate contribution to national 
security, as statements and actions by the military and others 
indicate,264 courts should no longer defer to congressional judgment 
                                                          
 258. See supra note 34 (noting that although registration did not reemerge until 
1980, Selective Service continued to register after the draft ended in 1973, and 
continued to exist after registration was suspended in 1975).  
 259. Talking Points: Campaign to End Selective Service Registration, at http://www. 
nisbco.org/Talking_Points.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (arguing for an end to the 
Selective Service registration program) (on file with author); see also SELECTIVE 
SERVICE SYSTEM, FISCAL YEAR 2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (reporting an aggregate budget of $444.4 million between the years 1983 and 
2000), available at http://www.sss.gov/sssarh.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). 
 260. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES at 8 [hereinafter 2001 ANNUAL REPORT] (comparing the 
compliance of ninety-seven percent in 1991 with compliance levels of eighty-eight 
percent in 2001), available at  http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/SSS_2001 AnRpt.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2003).  Just as Operation Desert Storm appeared to encourage 
registration, there have been reports that compliance has also increased since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  See William Lamb, Draft Boards Stand Ready to Serve if 
Needed, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2001, at A6 (reporting anecdotal 
information indicating a rise in registration following September 11, and reporting 
Selective Service figures which show ninety-two percent compliance among draft-age 
men). 
 261. See Robert W. Gambino, The Selective Service System under Fire, WASH. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1993, at A21 (relating the former director of Selective Service’s remarks that 
Selective Service provides insurance that adequate forces can be assembled to meet 
undefined future challenges, “a prudent hedge against the unknown”). 
 262. See Clinton Backs Continuation of Draft Policy, BUFF. NEWS, May 19, 1994, at A17 
(reporting the President’s assertion that registration was “a hedge against unforeseen 
threats”).  President Clinton reprised President Carter’s symbolic characterization of 
registration by adding that eliminating registration might send the wrong signal to 
our enemies.  Id. 
 263. See id. (revealing that a DoD report prepared for President Clinton asserted 
that elimination of registration would have no effect on military preparedness). 
 264. See Bandow, supra note 10 (reporting DoD’s dismissal of any contribution 
that registration makes to national defense).  Outside of the Selective Service Agency 
itself, few experts in or out of government assert that registration serves a military 
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on the issue.265  The preponderance of the evidence indicates that no 
draft will be called in the foreseeable future.266  In any event, a system 
of ongoing registration is not necessary to conduct a successful draft, 
should the need arise.267  The registration requirement should thus 
be considered as separate from a gender-specific draft of combat 
troops.268  Removed from the shelter of deference provided to 
defense-related decisions,269 registration ought to be considered with 
the same heightened scrutiny required wherever an invidious 
discrimination based on gender is revealed.270  The gender 
discrimination imposed by the registration requirement cannot be 
supported by a claim that it is substantially related to an important 
government interest or even rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.271  
                                                                                                                                      
necessity.  See, e.g., id. (identifying a report produced by Congress’s own 
Congressional Research Service, which concluded that activating an improved 
military reserve force would constitute a better response to unforeseen conflicts than 
would drafting registered civilians). 
 265. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 89-90 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(stating that it is ultimately up to the Court to determine if the discriminatory means 
employed in registration were closely and substantially related to government’s stated 
objective).  At the time of his dissent, Justice Marshall voiced no quarrel with 
registration as a legitimate interest connected to raising and supporting armies.  Id. 
at 88. 
 266. See infra notes 376-77 and accompanying text (reporting various statements 
from within the military that a military draft is unlikely and is not part of current 
military planning). 
 267. See infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text (discussing prior successful 
registrations, which began at the onset of war). 
 268. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75-77 (concluding that the standard for assessing the 
discrimination against women in registration ought to be the same as that employed 
in assessing the discrimination against women in combat).  This decision was a 
reversal of a lower court ruling, which managed to separate the issue of women in 
registration from the issue of women in combat.  Rostker v. Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. 
586, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 269. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67 (asserting that Congress must respect the 
Constitution, but the standards applied by the Court may differ where military affairs 
are concerned). 
 270. See id. at 87-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that under the heightened 
scrutiny test, “[t]he party defending the challenged classification carries the burden 
of demonstrating both the importance of the governmental objective it serves and 
the substantial relationship between the discriminatory means and the asserted 
end”).  See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
727 (2002) (terming the intermediate scrutiny test for gender classifications to be 
“clearly established”).  
 271. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (creating the heightened 
scrutiny standard whereby a gender classification will survive an Equal Protection 
challenge if it is substantially related to serving an important government objective), 
with Penell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (employing the rational basis 
test, under which a law need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest).  
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A. The Armed Forces’ Low Regard for Draft Registration 
Initially, it is significant to note that the military does not factor in 
the use of a draft in planning for military contingencies.272  This view 
apparently has not been altered by the scope of military actions 
envisioned by the current Bush Administration against Iraq and other 
alleged sponsors of terrorism.273  In fact, the military appears to place 
more confidence in its AVF and its reserves than it has at any time in 
the past.274  Military activities since the revival of registration in 1980 
have never resulted in a draft.275  The military frequently has 
expressed its opinion that a draft is unlikely and that ongoing 
registration is unnecessary.276 
A DoD report submitted to President Clinton in 1994 was quite 
open and explicit in its position on peacetime registration.277  Despite 
the military’s subordinate role to the President,278 the report placed 
                                                          
 272. See Military Draft Wouldn’t Be ‘Fair,’ Army Secretary Says, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 27, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter “Draft Wouldn’t Be Fair”] (reporting 
comments by Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera on the inherent unfairness and 
impracticality of a draft because so few additional young soldiers are needed, thus 
only a small fraction of the draft-age population would actually be conscripted).  See 
also infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (emphasizing the abilities of the AVF 
and reserve forces to rapidly respond to regional threats envisioned by military 
planners, eliminating the need for draftees). 
 273. See Dana Milbank & Mike Allen, U.S. Will Take Action Against Iraq, Bush Says; 
‘All Options Are on the Table’ Against States That Pose Threat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, 
at A1 (reporting on President Bush’s statements regarding America’s war on terror, 
which cited Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as potential enemies, and invoked the threat 
of possible limited nuclear attack, but ruled out a draft); see also Doug Bandow, 
Fighting the War Against Terrorism: Elite Forces, Yes; Conscripts, No, POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 
430, at 3 (Apr. 10, 2002) (observing that the military is in the midst of a 
transformation from its former labor-intensive incarnation, which will likely result in 
further reductions in force while enhancing defensive capabilities), available at  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa430.pdf. 
 274. See, e.g., infra note 279 and accompanying text (expressing confidence in the 
ability to respond to crises by using active and reserve forces rather than relying on 
drafted troops who are untrained and difficult to mobilize); see also supra note 197 
and accompanying text (observing that the military’s declining interest in a draft is 
directly tied to their increased confidence in their professional force). 
 275. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (chronicling the scattered 
support in Congress and within the armed forces for a military draft, which has not 
come in response to military crises but rather in response to infrequent and relatively 
small recruiting shortfalls that were instead corrected by raising salaries). 
 276. See generally supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (surveying military 
admissions of disregard for draft registration and conscription made both to the 
press and in the form of reports).  
 277. See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (stating that suspending peacetime 
registration would present limited risk to national security given the low probability 
of the need for conscription).  
 278. Having clarified at length the military position that draft registration and 
conscription were unnecessary, the report concludes that registration should remain 
in effect until such time as alternatives have been considered.  Id. at 12.  A cover 
letter from Vice President Al Gore accompanied the report when presented to 
President Clinton, in which Gore concurred with the one sentence conclusion, 
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more confidence in AVF personnel and reserves than in drafted 
troops.279  The report asserted that reliance on draftees delayed 
Korean War mobilization by one year, and it concluded that 
eliminating registration was unlikely to hinder future mobilizations.280  
The 1994 report makes the view of the armed forces clear: the 
elimination of registration would not undermine national security.281  
The report characterized scenarios that might require a draft as 
“extremely remote,”282 asserting that with the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the AVF and reserves were capable of meeting “near-
simultaneous commitments,” without resorting to a draft.283  Current 
military planning emphasizes evolution beyond the “two major 
theatre war construct,” projecting instead the need for rapid, limited 
and decisive response by smaller and more mobile contingents.284 
It is not surprising that the military expresses these positions so 
freely in light of its sustained success with the AVF.285  Since the 
Persian Gulf War, DoD has emphasized the quality and mobility of its 
forces in operating the most advanced military technology in the 
world.286  The military no longer places great emphasis on mass 
armies, which it feels it cannot rapidly mobilize.287  The DoD view of 
the AVF is an established fact of U.S. military planning, which greatly 
                                                                                                                                      
without mentioning the report’s findings.  Letter from Vice President Al Gore to 
President Bill Clinton (Feb. 18, 1994) (on file with author).  President Clinton 
disregarded the report.  See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text (examining 
Clinton’s decision to maintain draft registration, despite the military’s indication that 
registration did not serve national security interests). 
 279. See id. at 9 (explaining that because the national security threats have shifted 
from global conflicts to dangers on a regional scale, the need for draftees on short 
notice is reduced). 
 280. Id. at 12. 
 281. See id. at iii (emphasizing that any potential risk to national security is 
particularly limited because of the low probability that conscripts would ever be 
called to service). 
 282. See id. (citing the improved quality of the AVF as sufficient to respond to 
foreseeable needs).  
  283.  See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (minimizing the need for a “safety net on 
short notice”). 
 284. See  Rumsfeld, supra note 33, at 2-4 (arguing that planning for such unlikely 
large-scale operations has interfered with planning for and investing toward the 
more likely smaller-scale regional responses). 
 285. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (reporting the confidence which 
leading DoD officials place in the AVF, based upon its actual performance in military 
actions). 
 286. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (detailing the events of the 
Persian Gulf War, which demonstrated the success of the modern U.S. military’s 
smaller and better-trained forces operating advanced warfare technology and 
minimizing massed army confrontation). 
 287. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing the strategic 
advantage resulting from the Allied emphasis on force mobility in conducting the 
Persian Gulf War). 
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complicates congressional justification for registration.288  It is not 
clear what interest registration serves if the DoD believes that it will 
never need draftees. 
B. The Ineffectiveness of Registration 
1. Selective Service does not fulfill its mandate 
In recent years, Selective Service has had great difficulty 
maintaining its initial success at registering young men.289  Although 
the Selective Service registration success rate has declined, the agency 
has always been innovative in its attempts to induce registration or 
uncover unregistered persons.290  Most of Selective Service’s recent 
successes have involved partnerships with states wherein denial of 
state benefits is imposed for failure to register.291  Whatever Selective 
Service’s actual successes, critics argue that it distorts its own figures 
to artificially exaggerate the success of its registration rate.292  In 
addition, Selective Service distorts its registration figures to create the 
appearance of a larger pool of conscripts than an actual draft would 
draw from.293  Selective Service also gives a false impression of its 
ability to raise draftees by emphasizing the numbers registered 
                                                          
 288. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75-76 (1981) (relying on legislative 
history, which emphasized that registration was in preparation for the rapid mass 
mobilization of conscripts in time of national emergency). 
 289. See Andrea Stone, Draft Registration Rates are Dropping, Especially in South, USA 
TODAY, May 17, 2000, at A8 (reporting an eighty-three percent registration 
compliance rate among twenty year-olds in the year 2000, compared with the 
reported rate of ninety-five percent in 1990).  
 290. See Mary Ann Sieghart, Greetings . . . Ice Cream Parlor Patrons Invited . . . to 
Register for the Draft, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1984, at A2 (describing the illegal Selective 
Service purchase of a list of members of an ice cream buyers club to match the 
names against their own records and used the list to remind boys who turned 
eighteen years old to register). 
 291. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 12 (announcing that through 
2001, twenty-nine states had enacted legislation in support of registration containing 
provisions from denial of state educational aid to denial of motor vehicle licenses). 
 292. See Richard Halloran, Compliance With Draft Registration Is Put at 93%, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1980, at A14 (reporting that the percentage of registered men fell 
below Selective Service expectations even as the base number of those required to 
register was underestimated to produce a higher percentage); 25% of Draft-Age Men 
Have Not Yet Registered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1981, at A14 (reporting Selective Service’s 
revised figures, which painted a much less successful picture of registration efforts, 
and noting that nearly one-fourth of those required to register had actually 
registered). 
 293. The statistic most frequently reported by Selective Service measures the 
compliance of all men ages eighteen to twenty-five.  2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
260, at 8.  However, men may register at any point prior to age twenty-six without 
incurring permanent penalties.  Id. at 7.  The draft plan currently in place requires 
men to be drafted in ascending order from age twenty and up.  Sequence of Events, 
supra note 139.  Thus, registration can occur well past the likely draft age and still 
contribute to this statistic of success.  
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without predicting its ability to successfully contact these 
registrants.294  Indeed, registrants are useless if they cannot be 
contacted in the event of a draft—and after registration, Selective 
Service relies entirely on the registrant to comply with change of 
address requirements.295 
Over the years, Selective Service has navigated a careful course, 
emphasizing its successes while avoiding controversy.296  To this end, 
Selective Service issues a bi-monthly periodical containing press 
releases and other self-promotion, along with testimonials of 
supportive government officials, particularly members of Congress.297  
No one has been charged with failure to comply with registration 
since 1986.298  Registration critic Doug Bandow, a former Reagan 
Administration advisor on military personnel issues, explains 
Selective Service’s survival by observing that “government 
bureaucracies are almost impossible to kill, no matter how 
outdated.”299 
                                                          
 294. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (contrasting Selective Service’s successful 
national promotion of registration with ongoing questions regarding accuracy of 
information, ability to update information, and data retrieval). See also Jacobs & 
McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (reporting on a Selective Service plan, at least as 
old as the current registration, which could start registration from scratch using 
current social security and tax information rather than the stale information in draft 
registration records).  
 295. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (reporting the results of a General 
Accounting Office survey, which indicated that twenty to forty percent of the 
addresses maintained by Selective Service may be out of date). 
 296. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 7-12 (describing Selective Service 
mechanisms designed to promote the ease of satisfying the registration requirement 
without appearing confrontational).  See also Selective Service System, Backgrounder: 
Women and the Draft in America, at http://www.sss.gov/wmbkgr.htm (revised Apr. 5, 
2001) [hereinafter “Backgrounder”] (restating the official government position as 
defined by the President, Congress, and history, regarding the exclusion of women 
from the draft, a position which Selective Service defers to with no apparent attempt 
to inject its own opinion) (on file with author). 
 297. See, e.g., Selective Service System, South Carolina Congressman Floyd Spence Dies, 
THE REGISTER, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 4 (reporting the death of a longtime congressional 
supporter of Selective Service); Selective Service System, Former U.S. Representative 
“Jerry” Solomon Dies, THE REGISTER, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 2 (same).  
 298. See Seattle Draft and Military Counseling Center, Questions and Answers About 
Draft Registration, at http://www.scn.org/ip/sdmcc/register.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2003) (reporting that twenty-one young men were indicted for refusal to register in 
the early 1980s, and explaining that prosecutions of registration dodgers stopped 
because the trials of these men actually caused registration rates to drop) (on file 
with author). 
 299. Doug Bandow, A Dishonorable Discharge for Selective Service, TODAY’S 
COMMENTARY, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/09-20-99.html (Sept. 20, 1999)  
(on file with author). 
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2. Effective prior registration does not enhance military preparedness 
a. A draft cannot contribute to rapid military mobilization 
Regardless of Selective Service successes at registering men, it still 
must quickly produce soldiers in the event a draft is declared.300  After 
legislation supporting a draft is in place,301 Selective Service estimates 
that more than six months will elapse before the first draftees report 
to training camp.302  Whether this timetable assumes that all local 
draft boards are up and running is unclear, but it is important to note 
that Selective Service has previously experienced shortages of 
volunteer personnel necessary to operate draft boards.303  The fact 
that registrants are not classified at the time of registration necessarily 
creates delays, by placing the appeals process after rather than before 
the notice.304  In addition to these delays, the training of draftees 
takes approximately fourteen weeks.305  According to current plans, 
over nine months would elapse before the first draftees were 
delivered into combat,306 longer than the entire Persian Gulf War.307 
                                                          
 300. See Selective Service System, Agency Mission, at  http://www.sss.gov/mission. 
htm (revised June 25, 2001) (defining Selective Service’s foremost priority  “to 
provide manpower to the armed forces in an emergency,” which presumably means 
rapidly) (on file with author). 
 301. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at 2 (stating that a draft will be 
implemented at the direction of Congress and the President under the authority of 
the MSSA). 
 302. Sequence of Events, supra note 139. 
 303. See Mark Libbon, Selective Service Recruiting Volunteers for Board, Debate Continues 
on Whether Draft Boards Necessary, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 31, 2000, at E15 
(describing a volunteer personnel crisis in the Selective Service because 
approximately one-third of draft board members nationwide approached their 
mandatory maximum of twenty years service).  But see 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 260, at 28 (reporting that board vacancies ranged from two percent to thirteen 
percent by region). 
 304. See Center for Conscience & War, Basic Draft Information, at 
http://www.nisbco.org/DraftInfo.htm (updated as of Mar. 1996) (summarizing each 
step in the draft process from registration through the appeals process) (on file with 
author); see also Ian Jones, Pacifists Prepare for Possibility of Draft, NAT. CATH. REP., Oct. 
19, 2001, at 7 (reporting a concern among conscientious objectors that, should a 
draft be called, there are only ten days to establish a claim of exemption from 
military duty). 
 305. Basic Draft Information, supra note 304 (explaining that draftees go through 
eight weeks of basic training and six additional weeks of advanced programs before 
they are ready for battle). 
 306. See id. (outlining that under the current draft process, draftees are not even 
called up to appear for examination and induction until six and one half months 
after the initial Presidential Proclamation). 
 307. See Operation Desert Storm Chronology: Important Events, at http://www. desert-
storm.com/War/chronology.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (reporting the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and Iraq’s surrender to Allied forces on March 
3, 1991—only seven months after the start of the Persian Gulf War) (on file with 
author). 
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The military has minimized the importance of rapidly mobilizing 
draftees because its active and reserve forces are fully capable of 
rapidly mobilizing for any foreseeable conflicts.308  Drafted troops 
would only be required in a prolonged war.309  In addition, military 
training facilities cannot handle the mass of inductees that a rapid 
draft would produce.310  The military neither wants nor needs 
draftees, and it cannot use them in the rapid deployment scenario 
which is the primary case made for Selective Service registration.311 
The actual contribution that registration makes to preparedness 
has never been clearly spelled out.312  Congressional justification for 
maintaining registration rests partially on the unsubstantiated 
assertion that registration tangibly strengthens military 
preparedness.313  In response to questions about the relevance of 
registration, supporters often cite the importance of the message that 
registration sends to U.S. citizens and potential enemies.314  But the 
vague, far-fetched scenarios that envision the use of a draft cannot 
support a claim that a draft would rapidly supply troops, because 
military planning and Selective Service procedures cannot 
accommodate such rapid mobilization.315 
                                                          
 308. See Review, supra note 140, at 6, 12 (placing active and reserve troop strength 
at 3.5 million in 1994 and terming that number adequate for any immediate need). 
 309. Id. at 12. 
 310. Id.; see also William Mullen, Days of the Draft Board Heading for History Books, 
CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1993, § 4, at 1 (reporting political scientist Eliot Feldman’s military 
manpower study, which concluded that the Selective Service could produce draftees 
much faster than the military could possibly employ them, and noting that the 
sudden influx of draftees would result in shortage of barracks space, hospital beds, 
and other necessities). 
 311. See Review, supra note 140, at 12 (concluding that the military would not be 
able to absorb the rapid influx of draftees and that ending the draft would not put 
national security at risk); see also supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text 
(contrasting the difference between the mobilization of draftees envisioned in Rostker 
with the military’s concern that draftees cannot be rapidly mobilized). 
 312. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (noting pro-registration 
comments that characterize registration as insurance against non-specific unforeseen 
threats). 
 313. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (suggesting that registration 
advocates may not have been able to furnish sufficient support for the vaguely 
asserted claim that registration contributed to preparedness). 
 314. See infra notes 365-75 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing 
claims of registration’s symbolic value and whether this has any military value, which 
justifies registration). 
 315. See infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text (arguing that Selective Service 
registration procedures are inaccurate and any time saved by registration in a mass 
mobilization is insignificant).  But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981) 
(characterizing Selective Service registration as an integral component to the rapid 
mobilization of combat troops). 
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b. Perpetual registration is not required to implement a  draft in a 
national emergency 
Even if a draft could quickly mobilize draftees in a national 
emergency, it is not clear that permanent registration is necessary to 
support a rapid mobilization.316  Selective Service estimates of how 
much time would be saved by advance registration have varied 
greatly.317  Shortly after President Carter called for renewed 
registration, a report authored by Selective Service Director Bernard 
Rostker came to light, which provided support for opponents of 
registration.318  The report recommended that registration be 
employed only in the event of a mobilization in time of national 
emergency.319  It also contradicted Carter Administration claims that 
registration would save ninety to a hundred days in a mass-
mobilization, asserting that pre-registration would only save seven 
days.320 
In both World Wars, registration began only after a draft was 
called, and yet millions of draftees were rapidly produced.321  Selective 
Service has devised its own plans that would allow mass-drafting 
without registration by using up-to-date voter, tax, and Social Security 
records.322  A DoD report indicated that in the absence of registration, 
modern data processing and information sources such as the Social 
Security System and state departments of motor vehicles could be 
used to quickly produce the same information.323  Selective Service 
nevertheless maintains an inventory of names, at great expense, 
whose accuracy is questionable.324  This suggests that while Selective 
                                                          
 316. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (revealing two Selective Service 
plans for conducting a draft without advance registration, both of which were less 
controversial than registration); see also Richard Halloran, Report by Draft Director 
Assails Registration Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1980, at A12 (reporting that President 
Carter disregarded the Selective Service’s recommendation against registration). 
 317. See Doug Bandow, Draft Registration: It’s Time to Repeal Carter’s Final Legacy, 
POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 86 (May 7, 1987) (suggesting that the widely varying claims for 
the improved mobilization provided by advance registration are tied to political 
currents and bear little relation to actual mobilization requirements), at  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa086es.html  (on file with author). 
 318. See Halloran, supra note 316, at A12 (reporting registration opponent Senator 
Mark Hatfield’s release of a Selective Service document, which cast doubt on the 
President’s claims that registration would speed up mobilization). 
 319. See id. (detailing Rostker’s recommendation to President Carter, which the 
Carter Administration rejected). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (noting that millions of draftees 
were registered in one day, after draft legislation was signed). 
 322. See id. (stating that the draftees derived from these lists would be sent draft 
notices that would be followed by face to face registration). 
 323. See Review, supra note 140, at 10 (discussing the effects of eliminating draft 
registration). 
 324. See Bandow, supra note 5, at 10 (citing a GAO survey that suggested that one-
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Service once claimed that it did not even need prior registration to 
affect rapid mass-mobilization, it now is unable to contribute to such 
a mobilization even with registration in place.325 
Selective Service’s obliviousness to its image in other government 
agencies is illustrated by a Selective Service website posting about the 
exclusion of women from the draft, which cites data from a 1998 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) study.326  The 1998 GAO study 
examined the impact on the budget of registering women with the 
Selective Service.327 The study concluded, without explaining, that 
excluding women from registration was consistent with the DoD 
policy of prohibiting women from participating in direct ground 
combat.328  The 1998 study creates an ironic contrast to another GAO 
study, released in 2002, which found the likelihood that a draft might 
be needed to be so remote that it recommended shutting Selective 
Service down.329  The study further asserted that the system could be 
started virtually from scratch for approximately the same amount of 
money as Selective Service spends per year.330 
C.  Congress’s Registration Decisions Should Be Given No Weight 
1. The deference granted by the Rostker Court to Congress’s draft registration 
legislation 
In granting deference to Congress’s decision to impose draft 
registration, the Rostker Court asserted that such deference to 
Congress is customary.331  The Court found that the constitutionality 
of the gender classification had been duly considered by Congress.332  
                                                                                                                                      
fifth to two-fifths of registered names have unusable addresses). 
 325. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (suggesting that the stirring 
image of mass-mobilization in World War II contributes to a nostalgic desire to 
maintain the institution even though it can no longer contribute efficiently). 
 326. See Backgrounder, supra note 296 (restating the official government position as 
defined by the President, Congress, and history, regarding the exclusion of women 
from the draft, a position which Selective Service adopts as its own) (on file with 
author). 
 327. See id. (reporting that the GAO study examined the costs of registering 
women and concluded that registering women would require amending the MSSA). 
 328. See id. (explaining that the GAO study did not address advantages or 
disadvantages of including women in the draft, or make policy recommendations). 
 329. SUPPORTING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF 
SELECTED GAO WORK FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 24-25 (Apr. 2002) (indicating the costs 
that would be saved if Selective Service were terminated), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02576.pdf. 
 330. See id. (describing that it would take more than one year and $23 million 
dollars to reactivate the Selective Service, which is currently in “deep standby” status). 
 331. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981)  (stating that deference to 
Congress is “certainly appropriate” because the lawmakers specifically considered the 
MSSA’s constitutionality). 
 332. Id.  But see supra notes 245-57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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The Court added that this deference, even where constitutional issues 
are at stake, is given greater weight where national security is at 
issue.333 
In support of this position, the Court cited prior decisions, which 
upheld government actions in the name of national defense that 
might otherwise have been deemed constitutionally impermissible.334  
The cases that the Court cited, however, share one common element: 
they uphold military authority over military personnel, facilities and 
functions.335  The only case cited that involved a civilian dealt with a 
man who was denied access to a military base to make a political 
speech.336  Registration, on the other hand, imposes a defense-related 
requirement upon millions of civilians.337  The Court’s consideration 
of this imposition of defense-related authority over the civilian realm 
consists of citing, with approval, congressional testimony asserting 
that registration and the draft cannot be considered separately.338 
2. Under current circumstances, the Court owes no  deference to Congress’s 
registration decisions 
Strictly speaking, perpetual registration is not a military interest 
inseparable from a draft.339  Drafts have occurred without advance 
registration,340 and the current registration has long existed without a 
                                                                                                                                      
changing and expanded role of women in the military). 
 333. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65 (explaining that this case does not “merely” 
involve the deference customarily given to Congress, but also involves national 
defense and the military in which the Court grants even greater deference to 
Congress). 
 334. See id. at 66-67 (citing multiple cases in which the Court accorded deference 
to Congress and the Executive over First Amendment and Due Process challenges). 
 335. See id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice for vagueness); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 
(1976) (giving deference to Congress under its power to regulate naval forces in a 
summary court martial case); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (rejecting a 
Due Process challenge to the Navy policy of giving females a longer period to be 
promoted than males, in order to continue service); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 
(1980) (upholding a prior restraint on the right to petition for military personnel)). 
 336. Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)). 
 337. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at back end page (reporting a total 
of 13,610,098 draft-eligible registrants as of Sept. 30, 2001, with well over one million 
entering the pool every year). 
 338. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68 (stating that “[r]egistration is not an end in itself in 
the civilian world but rather the first step in the induction process into the military 
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of registration to 
induction . . . .”).  The Court cites congressional testimony, which implies or directly 
asserts that the two are inseparable.  Id. at 68, 75-76, 79. 
 339. See Bandow, supra note 299 (discussing how registration is an outdated policy 
and unnecessary for mobilizing civilians in case of war). 
 340. See id. (asserting that Selective Service, starting from scratch with no advance 
registration, produced conscripts within seventy-three days in World War I and 
within sixty-three days prior to World War II). 
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draft.341  The Selective Service was created as a separate agency within 
the government.342  Congressional intent assures the agency’s 
continued independence.343  The Court itself has recognized that 
induction into the military and acceptance into the military are 
separate processes.344  While the Court has distinguished conscription 
and acceptance into the military from actual induction into the 
military, induction will generally follow acceptance.345  While 
registration was long considered together with conscription and 
induction as a sequential transition from civilian to military life,346 the 
current registration stands alone, clearly the least integral of the 
three.347  Regardless, twenty-two years of registration without a draft 
has caused registrations to be inextricably linked to inductions that 
do not in fact take place.348  The disconnect between registration and 
legitimate military planning dictates a reexamination of the 
deference that the Court granted Congress in Rostker.349 
                                                          
 341. See id. (observing that although President Carter reinstated registration, there 
has been no draft); see also Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (noting that in 
both World War I and World War II, millions of men were registered in a single day, 
after the introduction of draft legislation).  That so many registered so quickly in the 
face of certain armed conflict raises the question of whether this registration even 
facilitates a draft.  See id. (discussing equally effective alternatives to registration). 
 342. See Selective Service System, Background of Selective Service, at 
http://www.sss.gov/backgr.htm (revised June 25, 2001) (providing a brief history of 
the selective service) (on file with author). 
 343. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 451(f) (2000) 
(stating that “[t]he Congress further declares that the Selective Service System 
should remain administratively independent of any other agency, including the 
Department of Defense.”). 
 344. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 553-54 (1944) (holding that under 
selective service regulations, drafting or acceptance into the military is 
distinguishable from induction into the military).  The Court asserted that induction 
into the military marked the end of a Selective Service System administered process 
through which draftees are examined for suitability for service.  Id. at 548.  The 
Court concluded that induction formed the line between civil and military authority, 
and that prior to induction, a draftee remained subject to civilian laws.  Id. at 559.   
 345.  See Sequence of Events, supra note 139 (describing the draft as a process 
which necessarily culminates with induction into the military, unless the draftee is 
found unfit for service or receives a deferment or exemption). 
 346. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981)  (rejecting efforts to separate 
consideration of the constitutionality of registration from consideration of the 
constitutionality of a draft). 
 347. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (noting significant past 
examples of mass conscription and induction without prior registration, as well as 
the current registration’s long existence without serving a draft). 
 348. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68  (asserting that Congress specifically linked 
registration to induction, rather than establishing registration as an independent 
entity). 
 349. See id. at 66 (“The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and 
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident in several recent 
decisions of this Court.”). 
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In Rostker, the Court reaffirmed its lack of competence in the area 
of military affairs.350  The Court found that the military was best suited 
to make military decisions, subject to the control of elected officials.351  
But, in doing so, the Court deferred to Congress, which overruled the 
DoD position in support of the registration of women.352  The Court 
justified its deference by asserting that the DoD supported gender-
neutral registration in the interest of equity only.353  Such a 
justification can hardly apply now, as DoD’s disinterest in draft 
registration is gender-neutral.354  Regarding military affairs, the Court 
may be justified in deferring to the competence of the military, but 
the Rostker Court offered no evidence that Congress possessed 
comparably superior competence in military affairs.355  The current 
members of the Supreme Court possess en toto military experience 
comparable to that of the members of Congress.356 
In 1998, the Twenty-first Century National Security Study Group, 
an independent organization established by the Department of 
Defense,357 undertook a series of studies on U.S. approaches to 
international and defense issues.358  One of the Group’s most pointed 
criticisms was directed toward the members of Congress.359  In 
general, the Group noted the lack of knowledge and interest on the 
                                                          
 350. See id. at 65 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (stating that 
“it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have 
less competence.”)). 
 351. Id. at 65-66. 
 352. See id. at 63 (citing military testimony, which asserted that woman registrants 
would increase military flexibility). 
 353. Id. at 73. 
 354. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (describing a DoD report, 
which indicates the general belief that registration is simply not that important). 
 355. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-66 (characterizing decisions regarding the military 
as best made by professional military, though subject to civilian control). 
 356. Compare Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1997, at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jul/ 
milisoc.htm (asserting that congressional disinterest in military affairs can be tied to 
the fact that only one-third of the members of Congress have military experience 
versus two-thirds during Vietnam) (on file with author), with The Justices of the Supreme 
Court, at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/2572422/14mar20010800/www. supreme 
courtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (noting that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are military veterans and that Justice 
Kennedy served in the California Army National Guard) (on file with author).   See 
also generally THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 446-505 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995) 
(reporting that seven of the nine justices that served on the Rostker court had 
military experience).   
 357. See The National Security Study Charter Update, at http://www.nssg.gov/ 
About_Us/Charter/charter.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002) (stating that the Group is 
supported by the President, Congress, and DoD) (on file with author). 
 358. See MILITARY ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 5 (calling the reports collectively an 
“‘action plan’ for the new Administration and the Congress”). 
 359. The 21st Century National Security Study Group, PHASE III REPORT: ROADMAP 
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE, at 110-115 (2001), available at 
http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (last visited July 20, 2002). 
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part of Congress regarding foreign and defense affairs,360 and the 
report urged congressional leaders to take steps to educate newer 
members.361  It also urged that Congress become more open to 
outside consultation on complex defense issues.362  At present, 
Congress possesses no special competence with which to contradict 
the military view that registration is not a national security issue.363  Its 
decision to maintain gender-specific registration should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.364 
In reexamining its deference to Congress on the issue of 
registration, today’s Court would have to consider whether legitimate 
national security interests are keeping registration in place, or 
whether it is being maintained for other reasons.365  When President 
Carter called for the reinstatement of the draft, he declared that its 
purpose was to “demonstrate [America’s] resolve as a nation.”366  
Former Carter military advisor Richard Danzig has asserted that he 
and his colleagues saw the registration issue as purely symbolic.367  
Within the Carter Administration, it was assumed that a drafted force 
could not be rapidly mobilized in an emergency and registration 
information would quickly become outdated.368 
Critics have asserted that registration was and remains nothing 
more than a symbolic gesture, which fails even on that minimal 
level.369  Prior to becoming President, Ronald Reagan pointed out 
                                                          
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 111. 
 362. Id. at 114. 
 363. No member of Congress has persuasively contradicted the military position 
on registration and the draft, and in the face of the detailed arguments from the 
military and registration critics against registration, congressional arguments appear 
incredibly uninformed.  See, e.g., Sig Christenson, Officials Speak Against Move to Close 
Selective Service System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 30, 1999, at B1 (quoting 
several members of Congress from Texas who assert that eliminating registration 
would send a message that the United States is not concerned about readiness and 
undermine recruiting by creating a false sense of security).  Such assertions fail to 
answer the military charge that registration does not contribute to readiness, nor do 
they explain why a registration that does not contribute to readiness is not itself 
contributing to a false sense of security. 
 364. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying (analyzing the deference accorded 
Congress in Rostker which undermined the heightened scrutiny applied). 
 365. See, e.g., Review, supra note 140, at iii (citing several symbolic values that are 
attached to registration while discounting any significant military value). 
 366. Kohn, supra note 203, at 101. 
 367. Kerber, supra note 83, at 117 (citing an interview with Danzig). 
 368. Id. 
 369. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363-64 (elaborating on the 
symbolism of President Carter’s registration proposal as one of several measures, 
including the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and a U.S. 
embargo on grain and technology sales to the Soviet Union, which were 
implemented in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan).  The 
boycott was intended to embarrass the Soviets, and the embargo to penalize them.  
Id. at 364.  However, it has never been quite clear exactly what draft registration was 
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that advanced weaponry and an experienced standing army and 
reserves would symbolize U.S. resolve much better than a registrant 
pool.370  The controversy over registration in fact might have been 
counterproductive, indicating to the Soviets that conscription would 
be met by even greater resistance.371  Registration critic Martin 
Anderson, a former advisor to President Nixon, referred to Carter’s 
message to the Soviet Union by reinstituting registration as “a weak 
and possibly dangerous response.”372  Anderson assumed that the 
Soviets would better understand concrete steps toward a stronger 
military and would see through the symbolic gesture, which, in turn, 
provided a false sense of security to Americans.373  It appears that 
there was a common understanding that the introduction of draft 
registration was not actually intended to aid in military defense.374  
The Rostker Court made no assertion that registration as a symbol 
alone sufficiently satisfies the definition of national security interest.375 
3. The political motivations behind registration decisions 
Considering the current state of the U.S. armed forces, U.S. 
military alliances, and the threat posed by potential U.S. enemies, 
military actions that might lead to the imposition of a draft are highly 
implausible.376  Several times since the revival of registration, 
recruiting shortfalls or grave world events have resulted in scattered 
                                                                                                                                      
intended to do, since registration alone does not improve the military.  Id.; see also 
Bandow, supra note 32, at D3 (challenging President Clinton’s statement that the 
suspension of draft registration would send the wrong message to U.S. enemies such 
as North Korea and Iraq, asserting that such countries pay no attention to the status 
of draft registration, focusing instead on tangible U.S. foreign policy gestures). 
 370. Bandow, supra note 317. 
 371. Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 365. 
 372. Anderson, supra note 217, at 12. 
 373. Id.; see also Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 364-65 (asserting that 
registration was likely unnecessary to convince the Soviets that the United States 
would both defend its interests around the world and draft an army should war 
require it). 
 374. See Jacobs & McNamara, supra note 44, at 363 (indicating that the symbolic 
purpose filled a vacuum left by the failure to show registration’s actual contribution 
to military preparedness). 
 375. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981) (linking the exclusion of women 
from registration specifically to the drafting of registrants for combat); see John 
Lancaster, No More Draft? Pentagon Concedes Selective Service System May Not Be Necessary, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at A5 (characterizing a 1994 DoD report as extolling the 
symbolic value of peacetime registration even as the report concedes that registration 
has little foreseeable defense value). 
 376. See Weiser, supra note 284 (citing a report produced by the Army War College 
which concluded that the only scenario in which a draft might be used is if the 
United States simultaneously undertakes multiple military campaigns around the 
world, a scenario which the report characterized as extremely unlikely).  Further, Lt. 
Col. Brian Byrne, a Marine Corps manpower official, commented that “the draft is 
something we’ve given every little consideration to.” Id. 
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calls for the revival of the draft.377  These events notwithstanding, 
since 1981, no presidential administration has ever seriously 
considered a draft, though all have supported registration.378 
The imposition of a draft in support of a military operation would 
pose serious political consequences for an administration and for 
members of Congress.379  It appears that registration continues 
because it has sufficient support in Congress.380  Although registration 
affects many,381 it is largely complied with and imposes penalties for 
noncompliance on only a small fraction of the group it affects.382  
After thirty years without a draft, compliance likely would be far lower 
with respect to a draft than compliance with mere registration.383  
Congressional support for a draft likely would be weak because the 
draft has far reaching effects for entire families,384 particularly for 
those called to serve.385  General opposition to a draft might be 
                                                          
 377. See Graham, supra note 237, at A3 (reporting that military recruiting 
shortfalls have inspired some within the military to consider reviving the draft, even 
as they acknowledge that a revival is unlikely). 
 378. See Bandow, supra note 10 (reviewing the various reasons for supporting draft 
registration offered by every administration from President Carter to President 
Clinton).  Since its revival, every administration has publicly supported registration.  
Id. 
 379. See McCallister, supra note 4, at A23 (reporting that widespread political 
resistance resulted when the United States previously instituted a draft subsequent to 
entering a war). 
 380. See infra note 389 and accompanying text (documenting Selective Service 
survival through a 1993 congressional vote that threatened its existence). 
 381. See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 260, at back end page (indicating that 
2,946,115 men reached the age of 18 and registered during the 2001 fiscal year). 
 382. See id. at 8 (noting that approximately ten percent of those obligated to 
register do not, and suggesting that lack of awareness of the requirement is the cause 
of most non-compliance); see also supra note 298 and accompanying text (reporting 
that prosecutions for failure to register dropped significantly after the trial of several 
men who failed to register resulted in declining registration). 
 383. See Cassio Furtado, Poll: Many College Students Would Dodge Military Draft. 
Understanding Seen as Better Curb on Terror, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 21, 2002, at 7A 
(printing results of a poll showing thirty-seven percent of male college students 
surveyed said they would try to evade a draft if it were called today).  This statistic 
suggests that many young men may not connect registration with any actual military 
service obligation.  Furthermore, a theoretical thirty-seven percent draft non-
compliance rate would shift the burden onto those complying, eroding the fairness 
of a draft that even Selective Service admits would be inherently unfair.  See Draft 
Wouldn’t Be Fair, supra note 272 (suggesting that a likely limited draft drawing from a 
large pool of registrants unfairly places the burden of service on a small, random 
group). 
 384. See Rumsfeld, supra note 33, at 39-40 (acknowledging the burden of 
disruption placed on families of service personnel, particularly those called up from 
the reserves).  See also Detenber v. Turnage, 701 F.2d 233, 234-35 (noting that 
registration is much less a physical intrusion and restriction than that imposed by the 
draft).  
 385. See Carl Weiser, Does Anybody Feel a Draft? Some Calling For Return to Required 
Military Duty, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 27, 2002, at A-2 (noting one poll that indicated 
seventy-seven percent support among the general public for a military draft, but 
reporting another poll that indicated two-thirds of draft age college students who 
KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:09 PM 
2003] SELECTIVE DISSERVICE 753 
further bolstered by the current draft laws, which dispense with the 
complex and flexible system of deferments that former drafts 
contained.386  If a draft today were as equitable as the current draft 
laws mandate, influential opposition might come from well-
connected individuals who were not able to avoid service as they did 
in the Vietnam War.387  
After the Persian Gulf War, Congress attempted to end registration 
multiple times.388  These efforts were characterized by bipartisan 
support389 and the argument that registration’s expense is not 
                                                                                                                                      
might have to actually serve would oppose a military draft). See also supra note 208 
and accompanying text (discussing the wide scope and influence of the anti-draft 
movement during the Vietnam War, particularly the opposition of young men 
subject to the draft, even though such views were always minority views).  
 386. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (2000) (outlining deferment and exemptions from 
training and service); 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(h)(i)(2) (stating that “[a]ny person who 
while satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college [or] 
university . . . shall . . . have his induction [into the draft] postponed (A) until the 
end of the semester or term, or academic year in the case of his last academic year, 
or (B) until he ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction, whichever is 
the earlier”); see also Selective Service System, How the Draft has Changed Since Vietnam, 
at http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm (revised Apr. 22, 1999) (describing the elimination of 
the Vietnam era deferment, which required only proof that a man was a full time 
student, in favor of deferment that allowed only the completion of the current 
semester) (on file with author). 
 387. See Military Service Records, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1992, at A19 (stating that 
former Vice President Dan Quayle, former President Bill Clinton, former Speaker of 
the House Newt Gingrich, and President George W. Bush all avoided active military 
service during the Vietnam War using means that would not be available today); see 
also Howard Schneider, Dyson Was Against The Vietnam War; Record Shows He Was 
Conscientious Objector, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1990, at D1 (revealing that Maryland 
Congressman Roy P. Dyson, an ardent advocate of a strong U.S. military, after four 
years of student deferment, claimed conscientious objector status during the 
Vietnam War).  Conscientious objector status is reserved for those individuals, by 
reason of “religious training and belief,” conscientiously oppose war in any form.  See 
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000).  This excludes political, sociological or philosophical 
views and personal moral codes.  Id.; see generally Jim Lobe, Chicken Hawks as 
Cheerleaders, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Sept. 6, 2002, at http://www.presentdanger. 
org/commentary/2002/0209chickenhawks_body.html (documenting the lack of 
military experience among Bush Administration officials who are advocating war 
with Iraq, including Vice-President Richard Cheney, National Security Council 
Advisor Elliot Abrams, and Chairman of the Secretary of Defense’s Policy Board 
Richard Perle) (on file with author). 
 388. See 145 Cong. Rec. H7954-55 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1999) (reporting a 207-202 
House votes to discontinue funding for the Selective Service); 139 Cong. Rec. H4115 
(daily ed. June 28, 1993) (indicating a 232-187 House Vote to shut down the 
Selective Service); 139 Cong. Rec. S12103 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1993) (noting the 
Senate’s vote to keep the Selective Service alive); see also Guy Gugliotta, Capital 
Notebook: Now, Selective Service Is Receiving The Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1993, at A19 
(reporting a 207-202 House vote to discontinue funding for the Selective Service); 
Military Draft in Jeopardy: GOP Threatens to Abolish Agency, FORT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, July 16, 1995, at 8A (reporting a move headed by Rep. Newt Gingrich and 
Rep. Dick Armey to shut down the Selective Service). 
 389. See, e.g., J. Craig Crawford, Washington Letter: Not Much Noise in Battle to Save 
Selective Service, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 11, 1993, at A-10 (noting that a House bill to 
end Selective Service found support and opposition in like numbers of Democrats 
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justified by the stated purpose served.390  While congressional efforts 
to end Selective Service ultimately failed, only a narrow margin kept 
Selective Service afloat in each instance.391 
Opposition to registration may present little political risk for left-
liberal or right-libertarian incumbents.392  Such non-centrist views 
easily accommodate such opposition, and have already been 
endorsed by their supporters.393  However, the patriotic overtones that 
frequently intertwine with the issue of registration may prove more 
problematic to centrist Democrats and Republicans, for whom the 
wrong choice might become an issue during a reelection campaign.394  
With the 108th Congress possessing no great competence regarding 
military affairs,395 a bare majority keeps Selective Service alive.396  It 
seems then that members of Congress must choose between 
maintaining registration, regardless of its national defense value, and 
                                                                                                                                      
and Republicans). 
 390. See id. (reporting Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder’s characterization of 
Selective Service as a “relic” in voting against appropriating money for it); see also 
Gugliotta, supra note 388, at A19 (noting Rep. Fortney Stark’s comment: “Why would 
we [Congress] spend $30 million a year to a list of names of young men who turn 18? 
It eludes me.”).  
 391. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, The People’s Business: Government, Crime and Courts. 
How Georgians Voted in Congress.  Key Senate Votes, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 26, 1993, at 
G3 (reporting a 58-41 Senate vote to maintain Selective Service following a House 
vote to close the agency). 
 392.  See supra note 208 and accompanying text (chronicling the rise of opposition 
to the draft during the Vietnam War, beginning with the Libertarian right and the 
radical left of the political spectrum, and only gradually gaining support from the 
political mainstream).  
 393. Texas Republican Representative Ron Paul, a chief sponsor of anti-
registration legislation, is a former Libertarian Party presidential candidate who 
received the highest rating of any House member from the Republican Liberty Party.  
Republican Liberty Party, Liberty Index, at http://www.republicanliberty. 
org/libdex/LI2001_Over.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) (on file with author).  
California Democratic Representative Pete Stark, another frequent sponsor of anti-
registration legislation, was one of three House members from that state to receive 
and an “A” or higher rating from California Peace Action, out of a total delegation of 
fifty-two. California Peace Action, 2001 Congressional Report Cards, at 
http://www.californiapeaceaction.org/resources/documents/reportcards2001/repo
rtcards.htm (updated  Jan. 24, 2003) (on file with author). 
 394. See Helan Dewar, War on Terror Colors The Battle for Congress: Rivals Make Use of 
‘Nonpartisan’ Issue, WASH. POST, July 5, 2002, at A1, A4  (reporting a prevalent 
strategy, used by Republican political candidates in 2002, to examine defense-related 
votes of Democratic rivals and attempt to question the patriotism of the Democrat 
based upon the voting record); see also Brian Faler, Osama, Saddam and Max? Cleland 
Cries Foul, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at A4 (reporting a negative ad campaign used 
by an opponent of Georgia Senator Max Cleland, which portrayed Cleland’s votes 
against certain aspects of President Bush’s Homeland security program as indicative 
of Cleland’s lack of courage in the face of terrorism).  Cleland is a decorated veteran 
who lost an arm and both legs during the Vietnam War.  Id. 
 395. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (characterizing Congress as an 
institution as lacking knowledge and interest in military affairs). 
 396. See Kenneth J. Cooper, supra note 391, at G3 and accompanying text (noting 
that frequently only one House of Congress favors registration). 
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allowing a vote against registration to potentially become a campaign 
issue.397  The Supreme Court should not defer to the wisdom of this 
slim majority, whose judgment is guided by the influence of non-
defense interests, such as reelection.398 
VI. THE FUTURE OF DRAFT REGISTRATION 
By October, 2002, the United States indicated its intention to again 
go to war with Iraq.399  This prospect is coupled with renewed 
warnings of terrorist attacks against the United States.400  In the 
immediate aftermath of September 11th, Secretary Rumsfeld was 
noncommittal about whether a military draft was indeed in the 
future.401  More recently, Rumsfeld asserted that there was “not a 
chance” of a military draft being reinstituted.402  Despite reports that 
Rumsfeld has been at odds with the armed forces,403 the conflicts 
center on greater civilian control over military functions than over 
personnel issues.404 
A resolution calling for the elimination of Selective Service was 
been introduced by Reps. Ron Paul, Cynthia McKinney, and Pete 
                                                          
 397. See Bandow, supra note 299 (construing President Clinton’s support of 
registration as a political choice directly linked to Clinton’s own draft evasion). 
 398. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1981)  (acknowledging legislative 
and executive branch oversight of military affairs, while asserting that the military is 
best informed to make judgments on military affairs).  The Rostker Court added that 
Congress, although accorded great deference in its military decisions, is nonetheless 
generally subject to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  Id. at 67. 
 399. See Dana Milbank, Bush Bids to End Impasse at U.N., Outlines Iraq Plan, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 12, 2002, at A1, A11 (noting President Bush’s increased confidence after 
Congress overwhelmingly approved the use of force in Iraq).  
 400. See Dana Priest & Susan Schmidt, Al Qaeda Threat Has Increased, Tenet Says: 
Panel Told Recent Attacks Evoke Pre-9/11 Dangers, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2002, at A1 
(indicating CIA Director George Tenet’s view that a string of terrorist attacks around 
the world could be a prelude to more attacks on U.S. soil). 
 401. See Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld, at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09252001_t0925sd.html (Sept. 25, 
2001) (characterizing a draft as “not something that we’ve addressed, and . . . not 
something that is immediately before us. There’s no question but we may have to 
make additional call-ups under the emergency authority.”) (on file with author). 
Rumsfeld added that he did not foresee a draft taking place.  Id. 
 402. See Selective Service System, Statement: Status of the SSS After the September 11th 
Terrorist Attacks on the U.S., at  http://www.sss.gov/statement.htm (revised Sept. 30, 
2002) (posting Rumsfeld’s September 18, 2002 assertion that a draft was not needed 
because the military attracts and retains sufficient personnel) (on file with author). 
 403. See Vernon Loeb & Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld’s Style, Goals Strain Ties in 
Pentagon: ‘Transformation’ Effort Spawns Issues of Control, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at 
A10 (reporting tension between Rumsfeld and the branches of the armed forces, 
including a conflict with the Army over the maintenance of large traditional ground 
forces, which the Army favors, versus Rumsfeld’s desire to further modernize the 
armed forces to an “information age” force for the 21st Century).  
 404. Id. (reporting the dissatisfaction between the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force, resulting from a perceived lack of autonomy and input on major 
decision making).  
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Stark in 2002.405  The resolution noted that the armed services have 
had no trouble filling their ranks on the basis of voluntary service.406  
The resolution even noted with a touch of irony that Russia is 
eliminating its military draft.407  The resolution was referred to the 
Committee on Armed Services,408 and will not likely go far in the 
current wartime atmosphere.409 
In contrast, Rep. Nick Smith introduced the Universal Military 
Training Act of 2001.410  This bill demonstrates the lack of military 
knowledge possessed by some in Congress.411  The bill calls for all 
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two to be conscripted 
or volunteer for military training for a period of six months to one 
year, essentially requiring all men to train for the reserves.412  The bill 
graciously allows women to volunteer for such training.413  Peace 
activists are not amused by the symbolism of such a draconian 
proposal, asserting that it, like draft registration, is an advertisement 
for war.414 
While Congress stands deadlocked, those subject to registration 
face an ever greater array of sanctions for non-compliance, including 
greater difficulty obtaining a driver’s license.415  The denial of a 
driver’s license may actually punish individuals such as immigrants, a 
group that Selective Service itself acknowledges may not register 
simply because they do not understand the requirement.416  
                                                          
 405. H.R. Con. Res. 368, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 406. Id. at 2. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 1. 
 409. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (noting the danger that 
congressional votes against military legislation may be cast by political opponents as 
unpatriotic). 
 410. H.R. 3598, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 411. See supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text (analyzing the presumed 
abilities of Congress to oversee military affairs). 
 412. Universal Military Training Act of 2001, H.R. 3598, 107th Cong. § 4(a) 
(2001). 
 413. Id. § 3(b). 
 414. See Mario Hardy Ramirez, Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors Position 
Paper: The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 2001—H.R. 3598, at 
http://www.objector.org/positionpaper.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002) (conceding 
that the bill will not likely pass but expressing alarm that it could even be 
introduced) (on file with author).  The Position Paper quotes J.E. McNeil, director 
of the Center for Conscience and War, as asserting that such a proposal has no 
defense purpose and is an indoctrination into militarism.  Id. 
 415. See Selective Service System, State/Commonwealth Legislation, at http://www.sss. 
gov/FSstateleg.htm (last visited July 21, 2002) (examining state legislation that 
supports the Selective Service registration requirements) (on file with author).  A 
majority of states have conditioned the receipt of a driver’s license and financial aid 
on registration).  Id. 
 416. See infra note 420 and accompanying text (asserting that non-registration 
sanctions disproportionately affect low-income and immigrant men who fail to 
register in disproportionate numbers).  
KAMENS.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:09 PM 
2003] SELECTIVE DISSERVICE 757 
Additionally, male immigrants who fail to register prior to the age of 
twenty-six are ineligible for citizenship.417  Members of this group 
would be among the immediate beneficiaries should a court rule the 
current draft registration unconstitutional and registration and 
sanctions cease.418  
CONCLUSION 
Selective Service registration’s failure to contribute to national 
defense begs the question whether such registration would survive a 
contemporary constitutional attack.419  Prospects for a military draft 
are remote, and those negatively affected by their failure to register 
are a largely underrepresented, underinformed and silent minority.420  
The issue of draft registration rarely raises widespread concern 
except during infrequent large-scale military operations,421 and even 
then has not resulted in judicial review or legislative revision of 
registration.422  Consequently, the possibility that a challenge to 
registration will make its way to the Supreme Court in the near future 
may be as remote as the possibility of a military draft itself.423  
                                                          
 417. Selective Service System, Benefits and Programs Linked to Registration, at 
http://www.sss.gov/FSbenefits.htm (last visited July 21, 2002) (stating that the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service makes registration with Selective Service a 
prerequisite to U.S. citizenship if the man arrived in the United States before his 
twenty-sixth birthday) (on file with author). 
 418. It is possible, however, that a successful challenge to registration might simply 
uphold a gender neutral registration.  See Leslie Ann Rowley, Gender Discrimination 
and the Military Selective Service Act: Would the MSSA Pass Constitutional Muster Today?, 36 
DUQ. L. REV. 171, 184 (suggesting that a legal challenge to MSSA today might result 
in the inclusion of women in registration, rather than the elimination of 
registration).  
 419. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981) (introducing the decision as 
examining the discrimination in registration, without comment on the justification 
for registration). 
 420. See Selective Service System, FISCAL YEAR 1999 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1999), available at http://www.sss.gov/ 
PDFs/regisweb.pdf (last visited July 26, 2002) (quoting Selective Service Director Gil 
Coronado’s comment that the low registration rates among minority and immigrant 
men may be creating a permanent underclass of persons cut off from a wide range of 
benefits) (on file with author). 
 421. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (chronicling the public debate 
about registration that accompanied escalating U.S.-Soviet tensions, the Persian Gulf 
War, and military actions following September 11, 2001). 
 422. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the few legal 
challenges that followed Rostker in the 1980s, none since 1985). 
 423. In light of judicial and legislative reluctance to revise current Selective 
Service requirements, it may take a wartime draft to force the issue of inequity. See 
Backgrounder, supra note 296 (alluding to the vastly changed role of women in the 
military). See generally Fenner, supra note 113, at 23-26 (connecting a more gender 
neutral military obligation with women’s attainment of equal voice and citizenship).  
But see  Rowley, supra note 418, at 184 (asserting that a legal challenge to MSSA today 
might result in the inclusion of women in registration, even without a draft, because 
men and women are much more similarly situated with regard to combat than they 
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Under Rostker, Congress is sheltered by its asserted constitutional 
power and continues to impose an unfair burden on young men.424  
This burden is justified as preparation for a conscription that is 
unlikely to ever take place and as support to a military that does not 
want conscripts.425  Further, the ever-widening gap between draft 
registration and actual military functions undermines the justification 
for gender discriminations.426  Women and men may or may not be 
similarly situated with regard to serving in combat, but they are 
identically situated with regard to registration if there will never be a 
draft, as appears likely.427  These circumstances differ from those 
under which Rostker was decided, and they call for a reassessment of 
the standards established.428 
Changed circumstances have not altered the continued imposition 
of an invidious classification, which requires men to register or face 
penalties if they do not.429  Applying the standards and evidence used 
                                                                                                                                      
were when Rostker was decided).  See also infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text 
(detailing changed circumstances regarding numbers and duties of women in the 
military, as well as the methods of fighting war, that would affect a Supreme Court 
analysis of registration, as well as Selective Service and DoD acknowledgements that 
the analysis would necessarily differ from that employed by the Rostker court). 
 424. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the deference 
granted to Congress by the Rostker Court regarding defense-related decisions). 
 425. See John Lancaster, No More Draft? Pentagon Concedes Selective Service System May 
Not Be Necessary, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at A5 (quoting a DoD report to Congress 
that asserted “with reduced force levels combined with two decades of successful 
experience with raising and maintaining a volunteer force, . . . recent victorious 
wartime experiences, and the quality of active and reserve personnel, it is highly 
unlikely that we will have to reinstate the draft in the foreseeable future.”). 
 426. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s view 
that registration was wholly integrated with conscription and induction into the 
military, primarily for combat duties from which women are prohibited, thus 
providing a basis for the exclusion of women from registration). 
 427. The Rostker Court rejected the rational relation standard that the government 
asked it to employ in analyzing the gender discrimination question.  453 U.S. 57, 69-
70 (1981).  Instead it employed a greatly restricted heightened scrutiny standard, 
which placed a burden on the complaining party to overcome the presumption that 
the sexes were differently situated with regard to military service.  See id. at 94 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that the Rostker Court has required appellees to 
prove that “a gender-neutral classification would substantially advance important 
government interests,” rather than requiring the government to prove the same for 
gender-based classifications); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996) (asserting that where official classification based on gender is concerned, “the 
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State”). 
 428. The Rostker majority invoked scenarios requiring the drafting of large 
numbers of primarily combat personnel, and reasoned that such a scenario offered 
only a marginal role for women, which justified excluding them completely.  See 
supra notes 111-40 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of that 
analysis at the time and the greater shortcomings of applying that analysis under 
current military circumstances). 
 429. These consequences are not insignificant.  Approximately 2,946,115 men 
were obligated to register during the years 2000-2001. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 260, at back end page.  More than ten percent of them can be expected not to 
register, based upon current Selective Service statistics.  Id. at 8.  Among the benefits 
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by the Rostker Court, the current Court would have much more 
difficulty upholding such a classification today.430  Women are a much 
greater part of the contemporary armed forces.431  Furthermore, the 
armed forces are far less ground-force centered,432 with a higher 
number of behind-the-lines support staff than at any time in U.S. 
military history.433 
It is clear that if a draft were somehow needed, there would be a 
great need for both women and men.434  It is clearer still that the draft 
does not figure significantly in the future of the U.S. armed forces, 
and that registration has outlived its original justification.435  Nothing 
about the makeup of the current Court suggests that registration 
would be held unconstitutional.436  The world has changed 
considerably, however, and such a decision would be in step with 
current U.S. defense needs and with the more enduring U.S. ideals of 
liberty and equality. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
denied non-registrants are federal student loans.  Id. at 7.  The federal government 
makes available up to $35,000 in Stafford loans to college students in a full-time four-
year program.  Dept of Educ., Stafford Loans at http://www.ed.gov/prog-
info/SFA/studentguide/2000-1/staffordlimits.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002) (on 
file with author). If ten percent of the non-registrants in these years alone applied for 
college loans and were denied, the funds denied would total more than $10 billion.  
See also supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text (surveying other benefits and 
privileges denied non-registrants, including drivers licenses and citizenship). 
 430. See Backgrounder, supra note 296 (quoting the conclusion of a DoD report that 
noted that much of the congressional testimony relied upon by the Rostker Court 
would be “inappropriate” to apply today due to the vastly changed circumstances in 
the military, most particularly regarding the altered role of women). 
 431. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text (reporting the steady rise in 
numbers of women in the military). 
 432. See CLODFELTER, supra note 118, at 238 (placing the percent of U.S. ground 
troops to its total force at approximately ten percent in 1967, down from 
approximately forty percent in World War II). 
 433. See id. at 238-39 (attributing the shifting ratio of support personnel to total 
personnel in U.S. military operations both to the demands of modern weaponry and 
to the comforts required by the modern soldier).  See also supra notes 254-55 and 
accompanying text (discussing the growth in percentage of jobs in the military open 
to women, which is now approaching ninety percent, an indication of the percentage 
of jobs that are not classified as combat positions). 
 434. The DoD recognizes this need despite the statutory combat limitation placed 
on women.  See O’Neill, supra note 248, at 180 (characterizing the current military 
practice of accepting and assigning women into the armed forces with far less 
prejudice than in the past, deploying them where individual preference, abilities, 
and regulations dictate, with less regard for the differently situated status). 
 435. See Bandow, supra note 10 (asserting that President Carter called for draft 
registration as a demonstration of strength in the face of Soviet aggression).  Today 
the United States is an unrivaled world power, yet draft registration remains.  Id. 
 436. The three dissenting votes in Rostker, Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan, 
are no longer on the Court.  The author of the Rostker decision, Justice Rehnquist, 
has since been elevated to Chief Justice. 
